My Current Philosophical Positions
I wish every philosophy book would open with a list of the author’s philosophical positions. This would make the book much easier to understand. Many times, I’ve been confused by a book and set it aside only to find out later that the reason for my confusion was that the author wasn’t using a correspondence theory of truth, or something basic like that. (This is why I often prefer secondary literature to primary literature in philosophy: secondary literature usually makes a greater effort at clarity.)
I’ve noticed this at Common Sense Atheism, too. My readers often leave comments that they are confused by what I’ve said, and it’s because they don’t know the hundreds of prior assumptions under which I’m operating.
Thus, in an effort to be more clear, I’ll try to illuminate my current philosophical positions.
Epistemology
From my epistemology flows everything else.
The continuous failure of intuition, first philosophy, testimony, subjective experience, and authority-based systems of knowing leads me to be highly suspicious of them. These systems are also undermined by recent discoveries about the capabilities and limits of human psychology. In contrast, the massive success of science leads me to suspect that methods condoned by science are the most successful methods of knowing we have discovered yet. This approach tends toward naturalized epistemology: I think philosophy will be most productive when it functions as an extension of successful science, rather than as a kind of “first philosophy” that works “before” or “above” science. And of course I endorse fallibilism. Even our best scientific theories sometimes fail.

This comics panel reminds me of a scene I wrote a few years back for a Superman screenplay I was developing. Superman has just appeared to the world and just averted a major crisis, and he decides to give a press conference. (Text reworked to make sense to those who are unfamiliar with screenwriting conventions.)
Don’t get too excited. Apparently, Superman is a 


