I know! Every time I typed the word I wanted to type an H.

I’m talking about objectively evaluating what people really believe. Do you believe Jesus is your friend and he is invisible. You objectively believe in an invisible friend.

And just for the record, I don’t think it would be right to speak of any person or religion in this manner. Hindu, Buddhist, or otherwise.

cartesian: I hasten to add that the problem of free will is a philosophical problem, and most neuroscientists are not trained in philosophy. This causes them to make some really bad arguments about free will (ask if you’d like examples).

Yes, I’d love to see some examples! Though, not because I particularly plan on disagreeing with you.

cartesian: I’m not totally sure what you mean by “motivational internalism” or “intrinsic prescriptivity.” Do you not believe anything at all resembling “desires are valuable” or “desires ought to be satisfied”? If not, how is your view a view of morality? (Maybe that’s what you meant when you said you’re a nihilist.) If so, what sort of experiments did you run to confirm your belief that desires are valuable (or whatever)?

Two big debates in meta-ethics are over whether motivational internalism and intrinsic prescriptivity are required for a theory of action to be a moral theory. Motivational internalism is the view that moral beliefs must provide some motivation toward moral action (even if they do not outweight other motivations). I think motivational internalism is false, and some people think that means I must be a moral nihilist. I disagree. Others think that any theory of moral realism must explain how certain acts have an intrinsic “ought-to-be-doneness” about them. I deny that there is an intrinsic “ought-to-be-doneness” about anything, and yet I assert that moral values exist.

“Desires are valuable” only to those who have them. Or rather, if you desire X, then X has value to you. I also would not build a moral theory from the notion that “desires ought to be satisfied.” (Also, I prefer the term ‘fulfilled’, since ’satisfied’ generally means (to moral philosophers) effecting a mental state while ‘fulfilled’ means effecting a state of affairs in the world. I find too many problems with mental state theories.)

What I do claim is that desires are the only things that provide reasons for action. You only have a reason for action to look both ways before you cross the street because you have certain desires that can be thwarted by failing to do so.

Most moral theories say that our reasons for action come from other things – like God’s will or categorical imperatives or intrinsic values. But these things don’t exist, so those moral theories are false. Desire utilitarianism makes only true claims. It claims that desires provide reasons for action, that certain desires tend to fulfill more desires than they thwart, and that other desires tend to thwart more desires than they fulfill. These are true claims about things and relationships between things that really exist. This true theory goes on to explain a great deal of natural phenomena that fits very closely with our moral language, which is why I think it makes for a good moral theory. But if you don’t think it’s a “moral” theory, it doesn’t matter. The theory still makes true claims about things that exist. If we decide not to call Pluto a planet, that doesn’t change anything about how planet formation happens.

cartesian: I gave you a dilemma: “So if credible neuroscientists told you that there are no beliefs, would you believe them?” I said that if the answer is “no,” you don’t defer to neuroscientists as you say you do. And likewise if the answer is “yes,” there again you don’t defer to neuroscientists as you say you do. What’s the response to this dilemma? Which horn do you take? Can you go between the horns? Or do you give up the view that you should defer to neuroscientists when it comes to whether or not beliefs exist?

If science proved that beliefs do not exist, I would say something like “I am experiencing what I used to call a belief that beliefs do not exist.” But I won’t spend more time on this; I do think beliefs exist. I can’t even imagine what it would mean for science to discover that beliefs don’t exist.

cartesian: there’s the historical fact that many things which were once self-evident to all turned out to be false.>> I’ve also heard this asserted (many times). But upon investigation, I can’t find even one compelling example. Do you have any?

The belief that the universe is fairly small. The belief in gods. The belief that we have free will. The belief that we have a cognitive sense for detecting moral values. The belief that demons cause disease. The belief that certain races and a certain sex are of lesser moral value.

>>What I meant to say is that the rejection of free will is not unusual at all among neuroscientists and philosophers of mind.>>

I’m with you on that. But I hasten to add that the problem of free will is a philosophical problem, and most neuroscientists are not trained in philosophy. This causes them to make some really bad arguments about free will (ask if you’d like examples). I don’t think we should listen to them when it comes to free will.

I said this:

cartesian: Compatibilists think that free will is compatible with determinism. Many of them think that we do have libertarian free will (I take it that’s what you mean by “contra-causal” free will).

You replied:
>>How is a theory of contra-causal free will compatible with a theory that everything is caused?>>
I guess I should have waited to hear what you mean by “contra-causal free will” and “determinism.” Apparently by “determinism” you mean “everything is caused.” (Interesting, since I’m guessing that you are a determinist. Please keep that in mind when you consider the first premise of the Kalam argument!) I know that this is a common use of the word, but that’s not how I (or most philosophers I know) understand the term. I take determinism to mean something like this: the laws of nature plus the state of the universe at any time t entail the state of the universe at any other time t*. You’ll find something like that definition here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/
 
I’m still not sure what you mean by “contra-causal free will.” Do you mean that free will requires that our actions have literally no cause? If so, you’re right, having contra-causal free will is not compatible with the view everything is caused. But if that’s what you mean, then we were talking past one another, since no libertarian I know wants to hold such a bizarre view about free will. Libertarians I know would say that free will requires some sort of control condition, or some sort of alternative possibility condition, or both. How libertarians spell these conditions out determines whether they are incompatibilists or compatibilists.
 
I take the control condition to be something like this: our actions are free only if they were caused by us, and not necessitated by the external state of the universe plus the laws of nature. My free actions have to be “up to me,” so to speak. And if my actions are all entailed by the state of the universe plus the laws of nature 100 years ago, and those things aren’t “up to me,” it would follow that none of my actions are free. So clearly, I think, that’s going to be an incompatibilist view of the control condition. And I think the alternative possibility condition shoudl be spelled out roughly like this: our actions are free only if we could have done otherwise than we did. I think that one’s actually compatible with determinism, weirdly enough.
 
–
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I went on to ask this:

cartesian: So what sort of experiments did you run to confirm your moral belief that desires are valuable, or that they ought to be satisfied, or whatever your view is?

You said:

>>I think morality is about reasons for action. Some may think this is insufficient – that for us to talk about ‘morality’ we must use a theory that includes motivational internalism or intrinsic prescriptivity or something. I understand that, and if that’s what morality is then I am a moral nihilist.>>

I’m not totally sure what you mean by “motivational internalism” or “intrinsic prescriptivity.” Do you not believe anything at all resembling “desires are valuable” or “desires ought to be satisfied”? If not, how is your view a view of morality? (Maybe that’s what you meant when you said you’re a nihilist.) If so, what sort of experiments did you run to confirm your belief that desires are valuable (or whatever)?
 
—
—
I gave you a dilemma:

cartesian: So if credible neuroscientists told you that there are no beliefs, would you believe them?

I said that if the answer is “no,” you don’t defer to neuroscientists as you say you do. And likewise if the answer is “yes,” there again you don’t defer to neuroscientists as you say you do. What’s the response to this dilemma? Which horn do you take? Can you go between the horns? Or do you give up the view that you should defer to neuroscientists when it comes to whether or not beliefs exist?


>>Is a thermostat’s behavior best explained by its belief that it is 72-degrees inside the room and its desire that it be 65-degrees inside the room? That’s a major part of how we infer the existence of beliefs and desires in humans… But if thermostats have ‘desires’, what ARE desires?>>
 
I don’t think thermostats have desires or beliefs. They have states that are somewhat similar or analogical to beliefs and desires, so we speak metaphorically of them having beliefs and desires, just as we say things like “My speedometer says I’m going 60mph.” Speedometers don’t actually say anything. That’s just metaphorical. Likewise with thermostats.
 
>>Another way to put it is that there is no universal now, no universal clock ticking all matter and energy through time at the same pace. It is a prephilosophical intuition (even a ‘certainty’, maybe) that such a universal clock exists, but it is an empirical result that the universe does not work this way.>>
 
I have no such intuition. I think people (including me) have the intuition that the present moment exists, but that’s perfectly compatible with what Einstein taught us. So I don’t think Einstein gave us defeaters for any of our prephilosophical intuitions.
 
–
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>>there’s the historical fact that many things which were once self-evident to all turned out to be false.>>
 
I’ve also heard this asserted (many times). But upon investigation, I can’t find even one compelling example. Do you have any?
(The best one I can find is the naive-comprehension axiom, but I have a story to tell there about the illegitimate nature of “does not exemplify itself” or “is not a member of itself” or however you set up the axiom and the resulting paradox.)

“cartesian: … Compatibilists think that free will is compatible with determinism. Many of them think that we do have libertarian free will (I take it that’s what you mean by “contra-causal” free will). David Lewis, for one, was a compatibilist who believed in full-blown determinism, but also believed that we very often have the ability to do otherwise than we in fact will do.”

No compatibilist thinks that we have libertarian free will since, by definition, libertarians are incompatibilists. And surely, compatibilists reject “contra-causal freedom” – as do many modern libertarians, like e.g. robert kane (kane would never say that our free choices “go against” natural causal processes; instead, he thinks that they are realised by indeterministic neural events).

On the other hand, most compatibilists (like e.g. David Lewis) hold that we have the “ability to otherwise”, since they interpret “being able to do otherwise” in a way that is compatible with the truth of determinism.

cartesian: So how did you know that? Did you conduct a poll? Was a poll conducted? Or are you just guessing?

I think my wording was too strong. Certainly, the subject of free will is controversial. What I meant to say is that the rejection of free will is not unusual at all among neuroscientists and philosophers of mind.

My statement that illusionism about free will is “not even controversial… anymore” is a weak one, based on my own readings and the few times I’ve read that (1) most neuroscientists investigating the problem have concluded that free will does not exist, and that (2) a lesser majority of philosophers of mind do not believe in contra-causal free will anymore. But both could easily be mistaken. Perhaps if I read more stuff by metaphysical libertarians, they would be spouting opposite estimated statistics.

In any case, I’m sure you’ve done more reading on the subject than I have, cartesian.

cartesian: Compatibilists think that free will is compatible with determinism. Many of them think that we do have libertarian free will (I take it that’s what you mean by “contra-causal” free will).

How is a theory of contra-causal free will compatible with a theory that everything is caused?

cartesian: So what sort of experiments did you run to confirm your moral belief that desires are valuable, or that they ought to be satisfied, or whatever your view is? I can’t see any such experiment that one could do. So I think you’re committed to using your much-derided moral sense.

This is a huge issue I would one day like to write a big-ass book chapter on.

Morality is not a purely scientific endeavor. There must be some philosophy involved, to help determine which theory of morality best fits our language. The questions about which theory of morality ALSO fits what exists in the world – well, those are scientific questions.

I think morality is about reasons for action. Some may think this is insufficient – that for us to talk about ‘morality’ we must use a theory that includes motivational internalism or intrinsic prescriptivity or something. I understand that, and if that’s what morality is then I am a moral nihilist. But I think we can strip the ‘error’ out of our moral theories and still keep the useful parts of moral language – just as we kept talking about atoms even though they are not indivisible, and we kept talking about malaria even though it is not ‘bad air.’

Desire utilitarianism thinks that morality is about reasons for action. That fits with the broad assumptions of moral language. The theory also accounts for the 3 categories of moral action (obligated, permissable, forbidden), ‘guilty mind’, superogatory actions, and many other moral concepts.

Then, with regard to the empirical question, we ask: What reasons for action actually exist? It is an empirical question whether the wills of gods exist, whether intrinsic values exist, whether categorical imperatives exist, whether universal social contracts exist, etc. It just so happens that none of these things exist.

Desires, on the other hand, are reasons for action that DO exist. If you put your hand on a hot stove, you have a reason for action to remove your hand, and the only reason for action to move your hand is your desire to not be burned.

Now that is ‘reasons for action’ talk in a non-moral sense, so obviously I have a lot more to explain. But that’s all I have time for right now. I haven’t been happy with how I’ve been explaining how reasons for action can have descriptive and prescriptive force at the same time, so I’m still developing that and hopefully I will one day be able to publish an article that argues for this properly.

cartesian: So if credible neuroscientists told you that there are no beliefs, would you believe them?

I have a hard time imagining how beliefs could not exist. There might be purely philosophical arguments that prove that beliefs exist. Desires seem more uncertain. Is a thermostat’s behavior best explained by its belief that it is 72-degrees inside the room and its desire that it be 65-degrees inside the room? That’s a major part of how we infer the existence of beliefs and desires in humans… But if thermostats have ‘desires’, what ARE desires? What the heck does a thermostat have in common with a human brain?

cartesian: This is pretty unfamiliar terrain for me, but I always took it that Einstein (supposedly) taught us that there is no PRIVILEGED “now.”

Right. Another way to put it is that there is no universal now, no universal clock ticking all matter and energy through time at the same pace. It is a prephilosophical intuition (even a ‘certainty’, maybe) that such a universal clock exists, but it is an empirical result that the universe does not work this way.

cartesian: That’s one of those self-evident truths that don’t stand in need of any argument.

I’m quite skeptical of this notion that there are self-evident truths beyond those that are literally incorrigible (“I am appeared-to blackly”, “I am experiencing what appears to me as a chair”, etc.), probably because such a stance is so often abused to justify everything a person wants to believe in but cannot actually justify. Also, there’s the historical fact that many things which were once self-evident to all turned out to be false.

cartesian: Everyone thinks there are such truths. Otherwise arguments would never get anywhere. You presumably think one of those truths is “Desires are valuable” or something like that. And maybe you accept that “we ought to proportion our beliefs to the evidence.” And probably you believe that you exist. But you don’t accept these beliefs on the basis of any argument, and you don’t accept them on the basis of a really crappy argument like “I have a really, really strong feeling that p. Therefore p.”

I do not think desires have intrinsic value. What is true is that if I have a desire that P, and S can bring about P, then S has value to me. But that is an analytic truth about the meanings of the words “value” and “desire”, not a synthetic truth.

I probably believe something like “we ought to proportion our beliefs to the evidence,” but I don’t think that is self-evident. Nor should it be defended on the basis that it is self-evident to some people.

I also believe that I exist, but not because this is self-evident or because of strong feelings. While trying to avoid the very slippery ideas of “I” and identity, I will suggest that the best explanation for my experiences (which is all I have) and the one that requires the fewest number of hypothesized entitites is one that says some kind of “I” exists.

But the question of how to defeat absolute skepticism without referring to (unincorrigible) properly basic beliefs is a hugely difficult one and I am probably not taking the problem seriously enough. Oh, how I wish I had time to study everything!

You said:
Lukeprog: “Free will is an illusion, yeah. That’s not even controversial among philosophers and neuroscientists anymore.”

FREE WILL!!! said:
“Really? That free will is an illusion isn’t controversial among philosophers and neuroscientists anymore? How could you know that? Did you conduct a poll on this? Did someone else?”

So how did you know that? Did you conduct a poll? Was a poll conducted? Or are you just guessing?

>>I don’t know of any compatibilists who believe in contra-causal free will. That’s why they’re compatibilists, not metaphysical libertarians.>>

Compatibilists think that free will is compatible with determinism. Many of them think that we do have libertarian free will (I take it that’s what you mean by “contra-causal” free will). David Lewis, for one, was a compatibilist who believed in full-blown determinism, but also believed that we very often have the ability to do otherwise than we in fact will do.

>>Moral knowledge is gained the same way we gain knowledge about quantum mechanics. We do not close our eyes and ask our “inner sense” about the truths of quantum mechanics.>>

Interesting. So what sort of experiments did you run to confirm your moral belief that desires are valuable, or that they ought to be satisfied, or whatever your view is? I can’t see any such experiment that one could do. So I think you’re committed to using your much-derided moral sense.

>>I defer to neuroscientists on questions in their domain. If beliefs and desires exist, they exist in brains. That’s the domain of neuroscience.>>

So if credible neuroscientists told you that there are no beliefs, would you believe them?
DILEMMA:
– If not, then you don’t actually defer to neuroscientists as you say you do, since you wouldn’t believe them on this issue you claim is under their purview.

– If so, then still you don’t actually defer to them as you say you do, since you admit that you’d still have beliefs even after they told you there are no such things.

>>“If there’s anything we know for sure, it’s that there is such a thing as ‘now’, and if Einstein’s theory succeeds and proves this wrong, so much the worse for Einstein.”>>

This is pretty unfamiliar terrain for me, but I always took it that Einstein (supposedly) taught us that there is no PRIVILEGED “now.” That is, all points in time are equally real. But he certainly didn’t teach us that “the present moment,” as we use the phrase, doesn’t refer to anything. It does refer. Right now it refers to 12.13pm.

>>Having a really, really strong feeling that something is true does not make it true.>>

I don’t think the argument was “I have a really, really strong feeling that there are beliefs and desires. Therefore there are beliefs and desires.” I don’t think there was an argument at all. I think FREE WILL!! just pointed out that obviously, there are beliefs and desires. That’s one of those self-evident truths that don’t stand in need of any argument.

Everyone thinks there are such truths. Otherwise arguments would never get anywhere. You presumably think one of those truths is “Desires are valuable” or something like that. And maybe you accept that “we ought to proportion our beliefs to the evidence.” And probably you believe that you exist. But you don’t accept these beliefs on the basis of any argument, and you don’t accept them on the basis of a really crappy argument like “I have a really, really strong feeling that p. Therefore p.”

(at the end of the video)

The literature on free will is vast. But if you read and digest the Wikipedia page, you’ll know more than 99% of all people know about free will. After that, try Four Views on Free Will.

lukeprog: Having a really, really strong feeling that something is true does not make it true.

Thank you.

blindingimpediments: In addition, i do not quite understand your statement that “we should build conscious super-robots and let humans die off”.

I’ll write a post about this sometime.

Free Will!!: If there’s anything we know for sure, it’s that we exist, that we believe stuff, and that we desire stuff. If neuroscience delivers some contrary verdict, so much the worse for neuroscience.

“If there’s anything we know for sure, it’s that there is such a thing as ‘now’, and if Einstein’s theory succeeds and proves this wrong, so much the worse for Einstein.”

Having a really, really strong feeling that something is true does not make it true.

Free Will!!: I should have thought that compatibilism is the most common view among these groups. And of course most compatibilists are compatibilists because they believe in free will.

I don’t know of any compatibilists who believe in contra-causal free will. That’s why they’re compatibilists, not metaphysical libertarians.

Free Will!!: Maybe you should write a post about how morality could be real even though free will is an illusion.

Sure, I’d love to.

Free Will!!: How could you know such things, unless by your moral sense/conscience? It seems to me that you’ve just undercut your own (and indeed any other!) moral view.

Moral knowledge is gained the same way we gain knowledge about quantum mechanics. We do not close our eyes and ask our “inner sense” about the truths of quantum mechanics.

Free Will!!: Your beliefs about free will, our moral sense, and morality seem to be in quite a great deal of tension.You should give some or all of them up.

No, they’re actually compatible. If you want to understand my theory of morality, read my short book on it

Free Will!!: Haha, that’s hilarious. I think you’re unduly deferential towards neuroscience. You may as well defer to them on whether you yourself exist.

I defer to neuroscientists on questions in their domain. If beliefs and desires exist, they exist in brains. That’s the domain of neuroscience.

No free-will huh. that’s a tough pill to swallow. i’m not sure if i can accept that, but i guess if what you are saying is true, perhaps i’ve been preconditioned to not be able to believe in such truths; so in the end i guess i don’t really have a choice in the matter anyways and i am just simply cursed with a congenital disability that blinds me from truth.

In addition, i do not quite understand your statement that “we should build conscious super-robots and let humans die off”. perhaps i am misinterpreting it but it seems to me that you are advocating the building, promotion and ultimate survival of a super race of artificial intelligence over the inferior biological race of humans. if that is the case, then i don’t quite understand why you are trying so hard to convince humans to change their predetermined religious beliefs and keep them from killing each other. if i was to adopt your goal, i would think it be more efficient to allow the religious to kill themselves off in a holy war, to terminate the disabled, poor and those who have congenital defects like mine (i.e. not able to comprehend or believe in real truth) and to save the scarce resources of this planet to sustain the elite humans who are predetermined and able to know and understand truth so that they can ultimately devote themselves to the creation of an advance super-race of robots and then commit mass suicide after having achieved their goal. but maybe i’m wrong, maybe i’ve misinterpreted what you have said, or maybe i have just failed to see a more intricate plan that this blog provides which will ultimately achieve your “diabolical?” scheme.

Free Will!!: If there’s anything we know for sure, it’s that we exist, that we believe stuff, and that we desire stuff. If neuroscience delivers some contrary verdict, so much the worse for neuroscience.

In what sense do you mean that desires “exist”? Of course it’s obvious that we perceive ourselves to exist and to have beliefs and desires, but what does that mean? That, it seems to me, is the question that we have to defer to neuroscience on.

“And I do believe in morality…”
 
Maybe you should write a post about how morality could be real even though free will is an illusion. How could we have obligations and duties, if we’re not free? I don’t think my computer has obligations or duties, or is praiseworthy or blameworthy, and that’s because I think my computer doesn’t have free will.
 
If we’re just like computers – totally determined – why think we have duties or obligations? Why think we’re praiseworthy or blameworthy?
 
 
“I just don’t think our evolved moral sense – the “conscience” – can tell us anything about morality.”
 
Interesting. And yet you say you’re into “desire utilitarianism.” Do you think desires are valuable? (Yes, you do.) Do you think they ought to be satisfied? (Yes, you do.) How could you know such things, unless by your moral sense/conscience? It seems to me that you’ve just undercut your own (and indeed any other!) moral view.
 
Your beliefs about free will, our moral sense, and morality seem to be in quite a great deal of tension.You should give some or all of them up.
 
 
“only neuroscience will tell us for sure if beliefs and desires actually exist.”
 
Haha, that’s hilarious. I think you’re unduly deferential towards neuroscience. You may as well defer to them on whether you yourself exist. If there’s anything we know for sure, it’s that we exist, that we believe stuff, and that we desire stuff. If neuroscience delivers some contrary verdict, so much the worse for neuroscience.

Desires might be illusions, but I think they probably exist. The belief-desire theory of intentional action has great predictive success. But only neuroscience will tell us for sure if beliefs and desires actually exist.

When you say that free will is an illusion, do you mean it in the sense of being free to make any choice, or would agree that we have “limited freedom” to make choices based on our upbringing, level of education, ability to reason, etc?

Dr. Peter Kreeft presents 10 Insights into Evil from Tolkien’s “Lord of the Rings”

I just finished relistening to it, having first heard it 7 years ago.

Lorkas: Anyway, the point is that Thor kicks Jesus’s ass.

Here’s one version of that idea: http://imgur.com/MFUOV.jpg

Anyway, the point is that Thor kicks Jesus’s ass.

Lorkas: Poor Rinda. No means no, Odin!

Also notice the gods’ reaction. They decide that this time, Odin has gone too far because “by his stage-tricks and his assumption of a woman’s work he had brought the foulest scandal on the name of the gods”.  In other words: It’s not the rape, it’s the cross-dressing.

To get slightly back on topic, it’s possible to enjoy the myths and discuss them in a lighthearted manner but still pray earnestly to the gods and attend the public religious ceremonies. It’s Christianity that’s decided to nail its feet to the floor and insist that it is a true religion if and only if its sacred stories are actually historical truth.

Poor Rinda. No means no, Odin!

Lorkas: I just read the story of the theft of Thor’s hammer. I can’t believe Thor dressed up as a woman :0

Indeed, there we have a cross-dressing, lightning-tossing sky-god, no less.

There’s a much darker story (with some BDSM undertones) about Odin cross-dressing in order to impregnate a princess . It’s found here (search for “Rinda”):

http://omacl.org/DanishHistory/book3.html