While I appreciate why you didn’t challenge him on his views on salvation and damnation, I really wish you had.

Reading his own website, he comes across like a complete idiot.

Jesus did not come down to earth to exclude anyone but to lead as many people as possible to the knowledge of God… Christ makes no human distinctions—he died and rose again so that all people could have a personal relationship with the living God.

Which is why he damns most people to burn in hell eternally without any hope of reprieve. Ugh.

I will let Kip pursue the content of the rape discussion with you and add only these additional points due to your response to my comment.

“Under desirism, the most we could directly say is that Dick should change his desire.”
Surely, this is the most that the application of any moral theory could do? That is Desirism just makes this explicit and so puts the burden on other approaches that claim more, as how and why that could be done.

“it is only true because we subjectively believe that Dick should change his desire.”
Not under desirism, which is based on seeing if there is a determinate answer to looking at the issue objectively, meant here by transcending anyone’s prejudice, preference and partialities, and looking at the issue trans-culturally and/or generally (time- and place- transcendence). There may not be a determinate answer under such an analysis but, if there is (or is not), it is a provisional and defeasible answer, reviewable and revisable in the light of new data, this does not include subjective beliefs as to what is right and wrong.

“Furthermore (in defense of my ill-formed statement), under desirism it is automatic that Dick will act according to his desires, so saying that he should change his desire implies that he should not rape Jane.”
Not quite, Dick will seek to fulfil his more and stronger desires, however at the time of him considering (or not) to rape Jane the work has already been done or has failed. It is about creating a society where such socially malleable desires have already been inhibited. If Dick does still have such a desire and acts upon it then either society has not done a good job (being variably inconsistent, incoherent or ration-empirically ungrounded) or if it has then it cannot guarantee that everyone will so desire, it only serves to better minimise such desire-thwarting desire’s as Dick’s than other approaches.

“I am accustomed to using the terms objective and subjective for moral reasoning in a very specific way. I apply it to the source of “should” – regardless of what the object of “should” turns out to be.”
You can use those labels any way you want. However here the issue is as to whether one can obtain universally determinate yet provisional and defeasible answers to the question as to what people generally (or trans-culturally) have reason to promote or inhibit.

Does this help?

I just wanted to me the point out that Buddhist “desire” is not the same as BDI “desire” but rather addresses a certain sub-set of beliefs, desires (means and ends) and dispositions. That one framework can be understood in terms of the other. As for properly identifying and evaluating that sub-set and so on that is an interesting question but I have no time to pursue this right now. One day I will write a blog post in this.

However, if this is true (rather than that Jane should change her desire), then it is only true because we subjectively believe that Dick should change his desire. I reject the notion that Dick’s desire is conveniently more malleable than Jane’s. The only objective fact that could come into play is that Jane’s desire is somewhat weaker. For our purposes, the two are equally malleable (or unmalleable). So if Dick truly should change his desire, then this is a subjective “should”.

Furthermore (in defense of my ill-formed statement), under desirism it is automatic that Dick will act according to his desires, so saying that he should change his desire implies that he should not rape Jane.

I am accustomed to using the terms objective and subjective for moral reasoning in a very specific way. I apply it to the source of “should” – regardless of what the object of “should” turns out to be.

This article explains that we cannot persuade a person to change their desires through objective reason (here I read: “through appeal to an objective moral standard”), but can use praise and condemnation to get them to conform to our moral standard (which presumably must be informed both from a subjective standard and from reasoning objectively about how to arrange the world to match that standard).

A relevant passage:

It would be nice to be able to get you to want to fulfill the desires of others through reason alone. Unfortunately, reason cannot be used for that particular job – it is ineffective. But reason tells us what tools we can use; praise and condemnation. The claim that you should have desires that fulfill the desires of others is the claim that reason tells us to use the tools of praise and condemnation to help bring it about that people generally have such desires.”

The way I (and I think most people intuitively) use “objective” and “subjective” has to do with how we arrive at the “original should”, not how we derive other “should’s” from it nor how we use objective information to qualify or inform our response to that “original should”. If I had been reading about desirism with the idea in mind that the “original should” was not supposed to be objective, then I would have understood it better and would have been more sympathetic.

Naturally, there are other ways to use those terms and desirism seems to be careful to make the necessary distinctions. It’s just that I wasn’t cognizant of them when I was trying to make sense of all this yesterday.

“I agree your question about having no desires is interesting. If anyone knows of a desirism addressing Buddhism, please point to it.”

Dunno but here is my take on this. Assuming you have some familiarity with Buddhism there is an innocent equivocation over desire between these two theories. Buddhism identifies the problem of suffering as one that can be cured by freeing oneself from those “grasping” desire that bring about this suffering, that is both unnecessary and avoidable. One cannot avoid experiencing pain but can avoid additional reactions that are the suffering due to other desires and false expectations such as “why me?” Why not someone else”, “its not fair” and so on. It addresses desires that specifically adversely affect an internal condition of fulfilment of desires – namely a internal, psychological satisfaction condition. It is about inhibiting those desires that tend to frustrate other desires, and do nothing else, such desires based on certain false beliefs such as false expectations and so on. Does this help?

“Desirism seems to be subjectively grounded – at least ultimately – but has an important objective component.”

Merely referring to desires does not make a theory subjective, most certainly not as part of the meta-ethical category known as moral subjectivism, let alone any specific theory within it such as individual subjectivism or normative relativism.

A major and prominent branch of moral realism – that is objective morality – is the reductive naturalisms based on desires or desire-based ethics. Desirism is one version of this, along with Griffin’s Informed Desires, Brink’s Rational Desires, Railton’s Objective Interests/Social Rationality, Nagel’s Agent-neural objective reasons and so on.

If you want to call all these subjective that is your choice, but such a label is in my view unhelpful. Sinc, hese all argue that there are truth-apt moral statements, some of which are true, specifically independent of individual or group opinions or preferences.

Desirism is a theory derived from a systematic examination of the interactions of desires, grounded upon existing and well supported empirical psychology, that establishes and can predict determinate and publicly observable cause-effect relations. That is, unlike “indiviudal subjectivism” or “normative relativism”, it is amenable to ratio-empirical inquiry, capable of providing empirically adequate universal, provisional and defeasible conclusions, which is all that is needed for any other empirical inquiry to qualify as “objective”, so why not here?

I agree your question about having no desires is interesting. If anyone knows of a desirism addressing Buddhism, please point to it. I suppose the answer will involve the immalleability of desires, but that’s a scientific claim about which I am skeptical.

Jane does see something that will convince her that it is wrong, as do we. But Dick cannot see it. The reason to refrain from raping her is not equally available to all observers. It is available to Jane, but not to Dick.

In the real world, the situation is similar, but far more complicated, since there are now three or more sets of desires.

*What does “should” mean? Well, I would define it as the prescriptive moral operator. If morality is about right and wrong, then “should” indicates rightness and “should not” indicates wrongness. If morality isn’t about right and wrong, then I don’t know what morality is.

To restate briefly and bring back the terminology of subjective and objective: A moral system is objectively grounded if anyone who uses the best possible set of logical principles and facts about the world, will in principle find the same things to be “right and wrong”, regardless of their individual values.

A moral system is subjectively grounded if “right and wrong” will sometimes necessarily vary between two people who think about them using the best possible set of logical principles and facts about the world, depending on their individual values or some other feature unique to their personality.

Desirisim seems to be subjectively grounded – at least ultimately – but has an important objective component.

That’s my take (and as far as I am willing to take it before understanding the theory better). But I’m not one of those championing the theory, so I may still be wildly wrong and luke may simply being polite by not pointing it out to me a second time.

smijer> the problem still exists in this respect: there exists no objective basis for saying that Dick should not rape Jane. We only know that subjectively.

Without using the words “objective” or “subjective”, can you rephrase this? What does “should” mean to you in this context?

Thanks for the kind words.

However, reading the linked page (and the pages it links to) suggests to me strongly that desirism makes no claim to provide an ultimate objective grounding from which we can derive the view that Dick should not rape Jane. I am still working on desirism does say – but it seems to be more sophisticated than I originally realized.

OK… having done so (some – I have quite a bit more to read there), I believe that my initial objections are answered. My problem came from trying to understand it in purely objectivist terms. Understanding desirism as subjectively grounded, my objections wither.

Obviously, the problems implicit in subjective grounding come up, but it appears that the project of desirism is designed to help with some of them. And the approach seems very promising. I’m subscribed to CSA now & will look forward to reading more on the subject.

Thank you again. Great blog. Great podcast. Take care.

So, the right outcome between Dick and Jane would be for Dick to evaluate his own desire in terms of how the most desires could avoid being thwarted, realize that changing his own desire to rape is a recipe for reducing thwarted desires, and then do so? But if desires are so easily changed then why shouldn’t Jane be the one who reflects this way and changes *her* desire? After all, hers is initially the weaker one…. Or why shouldn’t everyone just stop having desires entirely?

Great question. And as far as I know, it won’t be answered in the link that Luke gave you (although your previous misunderstanding is).

The fact is that some desires are not malleable. Jane’s desire to not be raped may very well be such a desire (I think it is). The very definition of “rape” entails “without consent”, so there is no way that Jane can want to be raped. Now, we may be able to change the definition of “rape” in such a way that it would not cause this logical contradiction. It would still be bad for Jane because she doesn’t want Dick to have sex with her. The desire to have autonomy over ones own body is so fundamental to our nature, that it is practically impossible to change — it’s not malleable. The desire to force your will upon someone else, though, is not fundamental to our nature — it is a desire that is malleable. This, then, is our only option in reconciling (harmonizing) these desires.

Thanks for your interest, but I’m afraid your reading of Desirism is far from accurate. Start here if you want to learn more:
http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=776

Cheers.

As background, I am a non-expert, non-philosopher who has rather given up on an objective program of morality. Prematurely, maybe, but I haven’t regretted it so far except maybe the same way I regretted giving up the belief that I had a chance with that cute girl in my 9th grade algebra class. [I am happily married now and many years removed from 9th grade. And I'm not sure that there was such a girl - just trying to characterize the type of regret I might have over giving up moral objectivism.]

Now I’ll quickly summarize the objections I’ve read here that resonate with me in my own terms, so that I can clarify the response of desirism in terms that make sense to me.

I don’t have a specific quarrel with the “most” desires condition that isn’t subsumed elsewhere. So I’ll reduce the people involved to two so we can focus without confusion on the “strongest” condition. On this world there is only Dick and Jane.

To rephrase the Divine Command theory killer in terms of desirism: If Dick’s desired strongly to rape Jane, and Jane desired (less strongly) to not be raped, then (under desirism as characterized by this objection), it would be a right action for Dick to rape Jane.

Now, one response I read is that the “right action” is for Jane to convince Dick not to desire raping her. Having done so, we will not wish rape, and no one’s strong desire will be thwarted. Is this correct? If so, isn’t it still the case that if Jane is unsuccessful and Dick continues to desire to rape her, then under desirism it is the right action for him to do so?

The next response I read – and I may be reading this correctly at all – is as follows. Yes, under desirism, rape of this sort is the right action. We intuit that it is the wrong action, but our intuition fails. Desirism is well established, and therefore we can objectively conclude that under that scenario, rape is correct. Perhaps, if this is the argument, then it would continue to point out that our intuition is based on how strongly we expect people to wish not to be raped – that under this scenario the desire not to be raped isn’t as strong, and it is a failure of our imagination to imagine a weaker desire to not be raped and how it figures into the moral calculus. (Or conversely, how a much stronger desire to rape on the part of Dick than exists in our world could figure into the moral calculus).

If I am reading (and anticipating) this argument correctly, then I have major reservations and would have to back up and think through all of this over a long careful period of time before assenting to its merit. A further objection I would present is that such an answer fails to take into account the value of non-compulsion. I think we would agree that if two people have equal but diametrically opposed interests (I use this word to get outside the framework of desirism for a moment), then the outcome that doesn’t require someone to be coerced is the preferred one. In other words, Smeagol and Deagol each want the ring (which belongs rightfully to neither) equally, Deagol should keep it since Smeagol would have to coerce Deagol in order to obtain it (I would go to lengths to explain how this situation might arise without Deagol having a greater claim to the ring on another criterion such as findership, but I trust you can take this as a given). How does desirism cope with this?

The third response that I see is the effort to “go abstract”. I find this dissatisfying for the same reasons as the first response. Yes, in the best possible world, Dick’s and Jane’s desires will not conflict in exactly this way. That still leaves to be explained the notion that the world in which Dick rapes Jane is better than the world in which Dick’s desire is thwarted.

So, anyhoo. Am I reading you right? Am I just too dumb or lazy to understand how you have already answered my objections earlier in the thread? (I’ll concede that I had to skim some of it – it’s a very long thread and philosophy, as I indicated, isn’t my payday. Nor is the internet). In any case, I’d like to hear back from you.

I’ve really enjoyed Conversations, by the way!

I’m a scientist, not a philosopher, so you’ll have to take things slowly.

This should be a benefit not a hindrance, since it is probably better and clearer to consider desirism as a empirical extension of social, cognitive (and philosophical) psychology than as rational (philosophical) inquiry per se. It also serves as empirical support for philosophical criticism of other theories. However to criticise theistic-based morality it is not needed, since, as AFAICS, such a theory is philosophically incoherent, it cannot be a candidate for empirical consideration.

What I don’t understand is why this isn’t a problem at every level of the tower.

It would help if you could explain what theory you do endorse (whether confidently or not) and how it works in this example,as it would help indicate why you are not understanding this approach.

Sure if we just evaluate the last level (the current action) then desirism seems to fail.

This is quite false, no-one has demonstrated any such thing in this thread, especially since, as Chuck indicates, desirism holds that it is a deep (and all too common) mistake to evaluate actions directly. In morality it only makes sense to evaluate voluntary or intentional actions and, given our understanding of psychology, this only makes sense by considering and influencing the motivators of any such actions – which are desires. One directly evaluates desires and so indirectly evaluates actions, and that is all we are psychologically able to do. Any theory, such as theistic-based morality, that does not take this into account has a mountain to climb – if it could ever be made coherent.

So you say we have to look a level higher, and evaluate if those desires thwart or encourage other desires.

No, not a higher level, the only level that is appropriate and possible.

But those others desires can also be immoral, perhaps even the vast majority immoral…

That is what this analysis directly and primarily determines and note that the label “immoral” is an artefact of our language, it is a subjectively assigned label. Desirism posits that desire-thwarting desires (or equivalents) is the most probable and feasible external real-world referent for such a term as it is typically and commonly used. Again any other theory has to make a case for a better real-world external reference to be in any sense “better” than this approach and again theistic-based morality is a complete non-stater in that regard.

so we presumably have have to look at the next level up. And so on. What I don’t see at the moment is why the whole tower isn’t rotten.

Because you are making the deep mistake of considering acts first by thinking philosophically, not psychologically, ignoring how they are actually motivated and as to whether such motivations are practically justified. You need to look at the causal desire(s) and their relevant material and physical effects on other desires (actually the effects on their fulfilment or thwarting). When you look at it that way there is no “tower”. Anyway where is your argument for “rottenness” and what has this to do with desirism? Or is this an empty rhetorical assertion?

If I can’t apply the cost function on the ground floor, why should we think it will work out better on any of the others?

You can and must apply a “cost” function at that ground floor that is what desirism argues, so again where is your argument that desirism does not do this, or is this another empty rhetorical assertion?

What happens if the vast majority of desires are just plain evil?  

This analysis seems to be currently the best basis to establish whether a desire is desire-thwarting or not. A desire that causes great desire-thwarting we can label “evil”. Regardless of such a label, for such a desire there are many and strong reasons to inhibit it, in virtue of it being a significant desire-thwarting desire, and use of that label is most often recruited in to help condemning such a desire, given its illocutionary force, in further discouraging such a desire from increasing in a society.

I only agreed that I understood your excellent explanation. I’m not trying to criticize, so far, just understand.

> It seems like Chucky is willfully ignoring the definition of desirism being a moral system born from the assessment of desires not, the assessment of current action.

I’m sorry if I come across as disingenous. I’m a scientist, not a philosopher, so you’ll have to take things slowly.

What I don’t understand is why this isn’t a problem at every level of the tower. Sure if we just evaluate the last level (the current action) then desirism seems to fail. So you say we have to look a level higher, and evaluate if those desires thwart or encourage other desires. But those others desires can also be immoral, perhaps even the vast majority immoral… so we presumably have have to look at the next level up. And so on. What I don’t see at the moment is why the whole tower isn’t rotten. If I can’t apply the cost function on the ground floor, why should we think it will work out better on any of the others? What happens if the vast majority of desires are just plain evil?

Well explained. Why would a sum of many potentially morally bad desires be morally good? Do I simply have to accept this as a definition? 

Exactly. One should not accept any such definition. If a definition makes the “sum of many potentially morally bad desires” morally good, then there is something wrong with that definition of “moral good”.

Now since you agree that desirism, in this scenario, concludes, correctly with the opposite, which moral theory are you tacitly criticising? I presume, given the topic of this thread, that this must be a form of theistic-based morality. However I am not sure how that applies in your example.

Right. Fulfilling individual desires can often be (as in this case) irrational, self-destructive, and sadly our collective desires can sometimes even seem downright evil.

“So the dealer in promoting drug use and make available the drug is promoting irrational, desire-thwarting desires in others. If the dealer lacked this drug dealing desire, then there would be less of such desire-thwarting desires”

Well explained. Why would a sum of many potentially morally bad desires be morally good? Do I simply have to accept this as a definition?

This is off topic given the theme of this post, so to make it on topic, I will repeat he challenge once again that whatever solution offered by desirism – whether you agree with it or not – it is beholden on theists who support a McDowell type (christian apologetics) god to offer a legitimate alternative, not just to qualify as “best” but, at the very least, one that does not disappear into incoherence.

Both the addict and the dealer seeks to substitute a more fulfilling state of affairs for a lessor, and both do this by acting upon the more and stronger of their desires, given their beliefs. We know their motivations and these are not in dispute, it is whether these motives have legitimate and defensible justifications that is under examination here. In this case, there are two desires under consideration here, as there is a very specific cause-effect relationship or inter-dependency here.

The first desire under consideration – the causal desire, if you will – is the desire of the dealer to sell and promote the use of his drugs. This might just be a means to many other ends, nonetheless we wanted to consider if this is a justified means, not just to his ends but to those that he sells his drugs to – the addicts.

The other desire under examination is the drug addiction. Whether the addict knows this or not, agrees with it or not, to fulfil this desires it is irrational compared to his or her prudential interests. The addiction is a form of akrasia. The addicts desire is a desire-thwarting desire (when considered prudentially), since if the addict lacked the addictive desire many more and other (of his or her) desires would be fulfilled. It is in everyone’s prudential interest to inhibit such irrational desires.

So the dealer in promoting drug use and make available the drug is promoting irrational, desire-thwarting desires in others. If the dealer lacked this drug dealing desire, then there would be less of such desire-thwarting desires. So the dealer drug dealing desire is to be discouraged.

Can you explain why drug dealing is wrong on “desirism”? Both the dealer and the addict are fulfilling their strongly held desires. Perhaps I have misunderstood…