Arguments for and against Christian Theism (bibliography)

by Luke Muehlhauser on February 19, 2010 in Christian Theology,General Atheism,Resources

arguments for and against christian theism

*Under heavy construction*

Inspired by pages from exapologist and Chad McIntosh, this is my own bibliography of arguments for and against Christian Theism. In my usual style, I will link to PDFs of as many articles as possible.

Please contribute by suggesting additional arguments, papers, and books.

0. Preliminaries

0.1 How the Arguments Work

0.2 Justification and Rationality

0.3 God as the Best Explanation

0.4 Reformed Epistemology

0.5 On the Many Concepts of God

0.6 Theism and the Epistemology of Disagreement

0.7 Theism and the Burden of Proof

1. Arguments for Theism

1.1 Cosmological Arguments
1.1.1 Leibnizian cosmological argument
1.1.2 Kalam cosmological argument
1.1.3 Thomistic cosmological argument
1.1.4 A modal cosmological argument
1.1.5 An inductive cosmological argument

1.2 Design Arguments
1.2.1 Paley-style arguments
1.2.2 Fine-tuning arguments
1.2.3 Behe’s irreducible complexity
1.2.4 Dembski’s explanatory filter
1.2.5 Meyer’s DNA arguments

1.3 Ontological Arguments
1.3.1 Anselm’s argument
1.3.2 Descartes’ argument
1.3.3 Hartshorne’s argument
1.3.4 Plantinga’s argument
1.3.5 Godel’s argument
1.3.6 Maydole’s argument

1.4 Moral Arguments
1.4.1 Kant’s argument
1.4.2 Hackett’s argument
1.4.3 Craig’s argument
1.4.4 Linville’s argument

1.5 Epistemological Arguments
1.5.1 Incompatibility of knowledge and naturalism
1.5.2 Evolutionary argument against naturalism
1.5.3 Argument from reason
1.5.4 Argument from proper function
1.5.5 Argument from consciousness
1.5.6 Arguments for dualism and life after death
1.5.7 Incompatibility of naturalist epistemology and realisms
1.5.8 Argument from truth-antirealism

1.6 Conceptualist Arguments
1.6.1 Conceptualist argument
1.6.2 Argument from abstracta
1.6.3 Argument from laws of nature
1.6.4 Transcendental argument

1.7 Arguments from Religious Experience
1.7.1 Swinburne’s argument
1.7.2 Other arguments

1.8 Presuppositional Apologetics

1.9 Pragmatic Arguments
1.9.1 Pascal’s Wager
1.9.2 James’ will to believe argument

1.10 Miscellaneous Arguments for Theism
1.10.1 Argument from language
1.10.2 Argument from beauty
1.10.3 Argument from desire
1.10.4 Anthropological argument
1.10.5 Ontomystical argument
1.10.6 Argument from free will

1.11 Historical Arguments
1.11.1 Historical reliability of the Bible
1.11.2 Arguments for the resurrection of Jesus
1.11.3 Arguments for the divinity of Jesus
1.11.4 Arguments for fulfilled prophecy

2. Arguments against Theism

2.1 Logical Arguments from Evil
2.1.1 Mackie’s argument
2.1.2 Other arguments
2.1.3 Hanna’s argument

2.2 Evidential Arguments from Evil
2.2.1 Rowe’s original argument
2.2.2 Draper’s argument
2.2.3 Rowe’s Bayesian argument

2.3 Arguments from Religious Diversity
2.3.1 Arguments from inconsistent revelations
2.3.2 Drange’s argument from nonbelief

2.4 Arguments from Divine Hiddenness
2.4.1 Schellenberg’s argument
2.4.2 Other hiddenness arguments

2.5 Arguments for Naturalism
2.5.1 Melnyk’s defense of physicalism
2.5.2 Basic argument for naturalism
2.5.3 Religious naturalisms
2.5.4 Naturalism about minds
2.5.5 Other defenses of naturalism

2.6 Arguments from Incoherent or Incompatible Properties of God
2.6.1 Smith’s argument for the impossibility of a divine cause
2.6.2 Martin: omnibenevolence vs. omniscience
2.6.3 Rachels’ argument for the impossibility of worship-worthiness
2.6.4 Perfection vs. creation
2.6.5 Immutability vs. creation
2.6.6 Immutability vs. omniscience
2.6.7 Immutability vs. omnibenevolence
2.6.8 Transcendence vs. omnipresence
2.6.9 Transcendence vs. personhood
2.6.10 Nonphysical vs. personhood
2.6.11 Omnipresence vs. personhood
2.6.12 Omniscience vs. freedom
2.6.13 Justice vs. mercy
2.6.14 The impossibility of omnipotence
2.6.15 The impossibility of omnibenevolence
2.6.16 The impossibility of omniscience
2.6.17 The Impossibility of libertarian free will (even for God)

2.7 Arguments against the Historical Reliability of the Bible

2.8 Arguments about Jesus
2.8.1 Jesus as a failed apocalyptic prophet
2.8.2 Jesus as a myth
2.8.3 Jesus as merely human

2.9 Moral Arguments for Atheism
2.9.1 Bradley’s argument
2.9.2 Smith’s argument
2.9.3 Maitzen’s argument

2.10 Arguments against Miracles

2.11 Arguments from Biblical Evil

2.12 Miscellaneous Arguments against Theism
2.12.1 Anthropic arguments for atheism
2.12.2  Cosmological arguments for atheism
2.12.3 Argument from scale
2.12.4 Argument from the demographics of theism
2.12.5 Argument from the ineffectiveness of prayer
2.12.6 Ineffectiveness of Christian belief for personal transformation
2.12.7 Arguments from poor design
2.12.8 Arguments from evolution
2.12.9 Evidence against free will, and therefore certain forms of Christian Theism


One of the largest and most-discussed philosophical problems of all time is the debate between naturalism and supernaturalism. Is the universe a blind machine, or does it interact with one or more supernatural minds? Most people have a supernatural worldview, but most philosophers do not.1

Most of the discussion focuses on the debate between naturalism (the universe is a machine) and classical theism (an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing supernatural God created the universe and interacts with humanity). In particular, the debate has mostly taken place between atheists and Christians. No religion has interacted with science, analytic philosophy, and naturalism more than Christianity has.

Most theistic arguments support a variety of monotheistic worldviews just as well as Christianity, though they are usually intended to prove the existence of the Christian God. And because most philosophical defenders of theism are Christians, they often bring Jesus or the Christian Bible into their arguments. (In contrast, there are few philosophical defenses of the historicity of Allah’s revelation to Mohammed.)

Therefore, this page aims to summarize the debate between atheism and theism in general, and between naturalism and Christian Theism in particular.

arguments, how the arguments work

What’s the point of all these arguments? Are they meant to justify one’s own belief? Are they meant to persuade others? Are they meant to collectively triangulate the truth, one disagreement at a time? See: Alvin Plantinga’s new preface to his “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments,” in Deane-Peter Baker (ed.), Alvin Plantinga (2007); Graham Oppy’s opening chapter in Arguing About Gods (2006) and William Lane Craig’s review essay of the book in Philosophia Christi 10 (2008); Stephen Davis’s God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs (1997), pp. 1-12, 176-190.

arguments, justification and rationality

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arguments, god as the best explanation

Most theistic arguments take the form of an argument to the best explanation. God is supposed to be the best explanation for the origins of the universe, apparent design, consciousness, morality, and so on. So if it turns out that theism cannot be a good explanation in general, whole categories of arguments will fail. Likewise, if it turns out that naturalism cannot be a good explanation in general, whole categories of arguments for naturalism will fail. Given the silver bullet nature of this topic, you might think it would be well developed, but it’s not.

Part of the problem is that philosophers don’t agree on the nature of explanation. Significant proposals include Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed., 2004); Joseph Pitt, Theories of Explanation (1988); Wesley Salmon, Four Decades of Explanation (1990) and Causality and Explanation (1998); G. Hon and Sam Rakover, eds., Explanation: Theoretical Approaches and Applications (2001).

Concerning theistic explanations in particular, see: Gregory Dawes, Theism and Explanation (2009); Kelly James Clark, “The Explanatory Power of Theism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 25 (1989); Douglas Geivett, “Reflections on the Explanatory Power of Theism,” ch. 3 in Stan Wallace (ed), Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate (2003); Wilko van Holten, “Theism and Inference to the Best Explanation,” Ars Disputandi 2 (2002); David Basinger, “Miracles and Natural Explanations,” Sophia (1987). The best popular-level book on the subject is Layman, Letters to Doubting Thomas (2007).

arguments, reformed epistemology

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arguments, on the many concepts of god

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arguments, theism and the epistemology of disagreement

Many philosophers studying the ‘epistemology of disagreement’ assert that if an epistemic peer disagrees with you about some proposition P, this gives you some reason to doubt P. See Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement” (2005); Christensen, “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News” (2007); Feldman & Warfield (eds.), Disagreement (2010).

Papers that have applied the epistemology of disagreement to philosophy of religion include: Kraft, “Religious disagreement, externalism, and the epistemology of disagreement” (2007) and “An Externalist, Contextualist Epistemology of Disagreement About Religion” (2009); Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements” (2007); DePoe, “The Significance of Religious Disagreement” (forthcoming); Baldwin & Thune, “The Epistemological Limits of Experience-Based Exclusive Religious Belief” (2008); Conee, “Peerage” (draft).

arguments, theism and the burden of proof

Though most assume the theist carries the burden of proof, some philosophers argue differently. The starting point for these discussions is often Antony Flew’s “The Presumption of Atheism” (1976).

Relevant papers include: Adams, “Presumption and the Necessary Existence of God” (1988); Copan, “The Presumptuousness of Atheism” (unpublished); Dawes, “Religious Studies, Faith, and the Presumption of Naturalism” (2003); DeRose, “Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of Evil” (1991); Scriven, “The Presumption of Atheism” (1966); Shalkowski, “Atheological Apologetics” (1989); Sullivan, “The Burden of Proof and the Presumption of Atheism” (unpublished).

arguments for theism

Here they are, the much-discussed theistic arguments, along with many other less-discussed arguments.

arguments, cosmological arguments

1.1.1 Leibnizian cosmological argument

This argument asserts that God is the only sufficient reason for the existence of the universe, and depends on the controversial Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). Peter van Inwagen is widely thought to have disproved the PSR in An Essay on Free Will (1988), so contemporary versions try to sidestep van Inwagen’s criticisms.

Contemporary literature includes: Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (1975); Leftow, “A Leibnizian Cosmological Argument” (1989); Rowe, “Circular Explanations, Cosmological Arguments, and Sufficient Reasons” (1997); Davis, “The Cosmological Argument and the Epistemic Status of Belief in God” (1999); Pruss, “Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments” (2009); Why There is Something Rather than Nothing (2004); Pruss, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment (2006); Oppy, chapter 3 of Arguing About Gods (2006).

1.1.2 Kalam cosmological argument

This argument asserts that the universe must have had a beginning, and since everything with a beginning must be caused, the universe has a cause, and that cause is God. The key defender is William Lane Craig. See my full bibliography here, but key works include: Smith & Craig, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology (1993); Nowacki, The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God (2007); Craig, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument” (2009).

1.1.3 Thomistic cosmological argument

This argument asserts the need for a first cause based on the universe being contingent. It was not taken seriously during most of the 20th century, but recently has seen some serious defense, though obviously not in traditional Thomistic form: O’Connor, Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Ultimate Shape of Contingency (2008); Vallicella, A Paradigm Theory of Existence: Onto-Theology Vindicated (2002);  Maydole, “The Modal Third Way” (2000); Peter van Inwagen, “Necessary Being: The Cosmological Argument” (2002).

Also see Koons, “A New Look at the Cosmological Argument” (1996). The debate between Koons and Oppy over this argument is summarized by Alexander, “The Recent Revival of Cosmological Arguments” (2008).

1.1.4 A modal cosmological argument

Several of the above contemporary Thomistic arguments are expressed modally, but a new modal cosmological arguments is given in Leftow, “A Modal Cosmological Argument” (1988). Another version is given by Gale & Pruss, “A New Cosmological Argument” (1999). It is criticized by Almeida & Judisch, “A New Cosmological Argument Undone” (2002); Oppy, “On ‘A new cosmological argument’” (2000); Davey & Clifton, “Insufficient reason in the ‘new cosmological argument’” (2001).

1.1.5 An inductive cosmological argument

Richard Swinburne thinks the cosmological argument is invalid; if it were so, “it would be incoherent to assert that a complex physical universe exists and that God does not” (The Existence of God, 2nd edition, p 136). Thus, he offers an inductive cosmological argument (ibid, chapter 7). It is summarized in Reichenbach, “Cosmological Arguments” (2008) and criticized in Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, starting at page 95.

arguments, design arguments

The literature on all design arguments is unfathomably vast. First I will cite a few sources on design arguments in general, and then I will survey the literature on each major form of design argument in particular.

Excellent overviews include: Manson (ed.), God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science (2003); O’Connor, God, Evil, and Design (2008); Ratzsch, “Teleological Arguments for God’s Existence” (2008); Dougherty & Poston, “A User’s Guide to Design Arguments” (2008); Swinburne, chapter 8 of The Existence of God (2nd edition, 2004).

1.2.1 Paley-style arguments

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arguments, ontological arguments

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arguments, moral arguments for theism

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arguments, epistemological arguments

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arguments, conceptualist arguments

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arguments, arguments from religious experience

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arguments, presuppositional apologetics

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arguments, pragmatic arguments

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arguments, miscellaneous arguments for theism

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arguments, historical arguments

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arguments against theism

Arguments against theism have received very little attention until recently, excepting the argument from evil. Thus it was that Alvin Plantinga, after responding to only the threats from positivism, the problem of evil, and an argument concerning the incompatibility of God’s omniscience with human freedom, was confident to proclaim, “Natural atheology, therefore, is something of a flop.”2 But as the below summary will show, there is a great deal of natural atheology to which theists have not yet even bothered to respond.

arguments, logical arguments from evil

A logical argument from evil argues that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing God.

2.1.1. Mackie’s Argument

The most-discussed version was given in Mackie’s “Evil and Omnipotence” (1955), though this is widely thought to have been refuted by Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, articulated in chapter 9 of The Nature of Necessity (1974) and in God, Freedom, and Evil (1977). An extensive bibliography of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is available here.

Among those who think Plantinga’s defense fails are Graham Oppy (chapter 6 of Arguing About Gods), Daniel Howard Snyder (“Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga’s Free Will Defense“), Quentin Smith (“A Sound Logical Argument from Evil“), and Raymond Bradley (“The Free Will Defense Refuted and God’s Existence Disproved“).

Aleksandar Santrac thinks the Free Will Defense is weak and unbiblical, and proposes a Great Conflict Theory as an alternate solution to the logical problem of evil in An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense: Whether Our Power to Do Bad is Something Good (2008).

2.1.2. Other Arguments

Other versions include: Aiken, “God and Evil: Some Relations between Faith and Morals” (1958); McClosky, “God and Evil” (1960); Bradley, “A Proof of Atheism” (1967). But these versions also appear to be undermined by the Free Will Defense, if it succeeds.

An exception may be La Croix’s “Unjustified Evil and God’s Choice” (1974), which offers a reductio proof that theism is inconsistent. According to Peterson (“Recent Work on the Problem of Evil“), “Theists have pointed out that their critics unwittingly commit either of two fallacies: either begging the question by selecting propositions to which theists are not committed, or lifting out of context propositions to which theists are committed but imputing new and convenient meanings to them.”

2.1.3. Hanna’s Argument

Hanna, “Resurrecting the Logical Problem of Evil” (forthcoming) presents a version of the logical argument from evil which attempts to dodge the Free Will Defense.

arguments, evidential arguments from evil

Under construction…

arguments, arguments from religious diversity

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arguments, arguments from divine hiddenness

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arguments, arguments for naturalism

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arguments, arguments from incoherent or incompatibile properties of god

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arguments, arguments against the historical reliability of the bible

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arguments, arguments about jesus

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arguments, moral arguments for atheism

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arguments, arguments against miracles

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arguments, arguments from biblical evil

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arguments, miscellaneous arguments against theism

2.12.1 Anthropic arguments for atheism

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2.12.2  Cosmological arguments for atheism

Under construction…

2.12.3 Argument from scale

The argument from scale uses the intuition that the universe is too big, and humans took too long to arrive, for a God to have designed it all with humans in mind. It first appeared in chapter 11 of Everitt, The Non-Existence of God (2003).

  1. See What Do Most Philosophers Believe? []
  2. God, Freedom, and Evil, page 75. []

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{ 26 comments… read them below or add one }

Charles February 19, 2010 at 7:29 am

How about the flip-side to 1.10.6, the Argument from lack of free will?


lukeprog February 19, 2010 at 9:06 am


Ah, yes. If libertarian free will is incoherent, as some have argued, then the God of classical theism is incoherent.


Bryce February 19, 2010 at 10:58 am

2.8.3 – Perhaps you should change it to “Jesus as Merely Human;” the orthodox Christian conception on the Incarnation is that Jesus IS fully human, as well as fully God.


Charles February 19, 2010 at 11:26 am


At least, we would know the Christian god of evangelicals and fundamentalists is incoherent. If (a) free will doesn’t exist or (b) belief is involuntary [*], then God isn’t justified in sending those who don’t choose him to Hell. In fact, to do so would make him evil.

[*] I think the argument from how we form beliefs is separate, one that stills works even if free will turns out to exist. (Not that I think free will exists, but it’s easier to demonstrate to a Christian forming a belief isn’t a choice than it is to show them free will doesn’t exist.


Morgan-LynnGriggs Lamberth February 19, 2010 at 6:22 pm

How could that cult leader fool have been fully both anyway- just more grist for us ignostics,eh?
Oppy,I and others don’t beg the problem of Heaven: the theists’ assertion of Heaven as paradox boomerangs on them and so, we hoist such as John Hick on their own petard and then state that what is good there would be just as good here, and this is no consistency of little minds. Oh, we can take Burton Porter’s way of the contrast could be betwixt less evil and more good or better still, the contrast amongst good, better and best.
I ever maintain : logic is the bane of theists.


Supernova February 20, 2010 at 1:17 am

I have to ask out of pure curiosity. But when you cite all of the works for each argument, have you read all of those?

If so, I’m absolutely and seriously impressed. Usually, I have to take notes and re-read the material before I fully comprehend it. Then on top of that I’m just a slow reader to begin with.

Oh Yeah! you’re missing some agnostic arguments. LOL. I’m sure there are arguments for either strong or weak agnosticism somewhere out there.


lukeprog February 20, 2010 at 4:32 am


No, I’ve mostly just read abstracts of all these books and articles.

I think atheist and agnostic arguments are basically the same, it just depends on how strong you think the case against God ends up being.


BREEEEEE February 20, 2010 at 6:07 pm

Swinburne has offered a historical argument that doesn’t seem to fit into the categories you have for historical arguments. See his Revelation, 2nd ed.


Lorkas February 21, 2010 at 9:31 am

Could you add this post to the Epic Posts sidebar?


lukeprog February 21, 2010 at 1:07 pm


Oh yeah. I should.


Michael April 8, 2010 at 9:08 am

Have you ever corresponded much with Chad? He is someone that I think that you might enjoy talking with. I would personally be interested in reading letters if you guys had a letter dialogue like you did with Vox Day and Tim Challies.


bmcg61 May 30, 2010 at 5:07 am

How about a little more construction…..


lukeprog May 30, 2010 at 7:33 am

One day, my friend, one day.


Allie September 30, 2010 at 2:31 pm

This is a very interesting site. I would just like to know, if you don’t mind: are you a Christian, or are you just very well-read?


lukeprog September 30, 2010 at 3:00 pm

Hmm? I’m an atheist.


wissam October 17, 2010 at 4:11 am

(1) If God exists, he freely created everything E ex nihilo (and in time*).

This entails both:

(2) Prior to the act of Creation, E did not exist but God did.


(3) Subsequent to the act of Creation, E exists and E is necessarily causally dependent on God.

(*Time is needed to make sense of Creation).

(3) Logic, morality, and science (henceforth LMS) is part of E.

(4)LMS is causally dependent on God (from 2 and 3).

(5) For all x and y, if x is causally dependent on y, then x is contingent.

(6) LMS is contingent (from 4 & 5).

(7) LMS is necessary.

(8) For all x, if x is contingent, then x is not necessary.

(9) LMS is not necessary (from 6 and 8).

(10) Contradiction- (7 & 9).

Since (9) follows from (1), (3), (5) and (8) and their necessary corollaries, and (9) contradicts with (7), then (1),(3), (5) and (8) contradict with (7). Since (7) and (9) are mutually exhaustive and (7) is necessarily true, then (9)is necessarily false. (1), (3), (5), and (8)= at least one of them has to be false since (9) follows from them.


wissam October 17, 2010 at 4:13 am

(8) and (5) are modal truths.


wissam October 17, 2010 at 12:16 pm

Another typo: the fourth proposition is labelled (3)…damn! I’ll rewrite it.

A layman definition of “contingent”: that a thing is dependent upon a prior thing for existence, or that it could cease or fail to exist.

Contingent= x is contingent if and only if it is not necessary that not-x (but x is actual).

hmmmm…I can state my argument in an easier way.

(1) If God does not exist, LMS would not exist.

(2) LMS is necessarily dependent on God (from 1).

(3) For all x and y, if x is dependent on y, then x is contingent.

(4) LMS is contingent (from 2 and 3).

(5) For all x, if x is contingent, then x is not necessary.

(6) So, LMS is not necessary (from 4 and 5).

(7) LMS is necessary (necessary truth).

(8) Contradiction- (6 & 7).

Note: (7) cannot be disputed (esp. by presuppositionalists).

(5) cannot be disputed since it’s a modal truth.

It looks like the argument is ironclad. However, theists usually challenge (3). I was wondering whether someone could help me out with (3). I want to know whether it is false or not, and if it false, how I could reformulate it such that the argument is sound.


wissam February 1, 2011 at 12:14 pm


there’s an atheological argument you didn’t mention. It is widely believed now that Platonism is inconsistent with traditional theism. Even Bill Craig knows that, so he became a nominalist. So if Platonism is true, then atheism is true (or at least, non traditional theism is true).


Luke Muehlhauser February 1, 2011 at 2:04 pm


Who has written on that?


wissam February 5, 2011 at 3:03 am


Many philosophers have written on it.

Here are links for articles:
(SEP for a quick intro on the subject)

Craig’s publications:

“Nominalism and Divine Aseity.” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.

“Why Are (Some) Platonists So Insouciant?” Philosophy.

“Divine Aseity and Abstract Objects.” Festschrift for Stephen T. Davis. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.

“God and Abstract Objects.” In The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity. Ed. Alan Padgett and James Stump. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

In this Q&A, Craig rejects Platonism:

“But, as I made clear, neither of these is my reason for rejecting the existence of abstract objects. Rather my misgiving is theological: Platonism compromises God’s aseity (self-existence) and undermines the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by positing beings which are self-existent and uncreated by God. It implies a sort of metaphysical pluralism according to which God is not the ground of being for everything other than Himself”.


Luke Muehlhauser February 5, 2011 at 1:53 pm

Thanks, wissam!


wissam March 6, 2011 at 1:13 pm

My pleasure, Luke!

There’s another argument against theism which you haven’t mentioned. Raymond Bradley discusses the Humean argument from contrariety of religions.

Good addition along with atheological argument from abstracta (above), imo.


Michael April 10, 2011 at 3:40 pm

Hey Luke, the parts you’ve filled in here are really excellent and to the point.
This whole thing is a great idea too! You are most definitely an ideas man in general Luke, you have a lot of vision.
I was wondering, are you still planning on updating this or is this one gonna stay the way it is for the foreseeable future?
I remember you writing that post about losing interest in PoR quite a bit so I just guessed that this probs would be left as it is for quite a while at least?


Luke Muehlhauser April 10, 2011 at 4:45 pm

No, this probably won’t be updated.


Jeffery Jay Lowder November 8, 2011 at 11:24 am

Luke — I have just posted a massive bibliography of academic articles defending arguments for atheism over at The Secular Outpost at


Jeffery Jay Lowder


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