Divine omniscience and knowledge \textit{de se}

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Abstract. Patrick Grim argues that God cannot be omniscient because no one other than me can acquire knowledge \textit{de se} of myself. In particular, according to Grim, God cannot know what I know in knowing that I am making a mess. I argue, however, that given two plausible principles regarding divine attributes there is no reason to accept Grim’s conclusion that God cannot be omniscient. In this paper I focus on the relationship between divine omniscience and necessary impossibilities, in contrast to the general trend of research since Aquinas, which has concentrated on the relationship between divine \textit{omnipotence} and necessary impossibilities.

1. Grim’s argument

Patrick Grim\textsuperscript{1} challenges the doctrine of divine omniscience by using John Perry’s famous example of knowledge \textit{de se}.\textsuperscript{2} According to Grim, since no one else – no one other than me – can acquire knowledge \textit{de se} of me, God cannot be omniscient.\textsuperscript{3} Ever since Aquinas, philosophers have been interested in the relationship between divine omnipotence and necessary impossibilities.\textsuperscript{4} However, in this paper I am concerned with the relationship between divine \textit{omniscience} and necessary impossibilities, which has attracted little attention. I argue that given two plausible principles regarding divine attributes, we need not accept Grim’s conclusion that God cannot be omniscient.

Imagine that, borrowing Perry’s example, I find a trail of spilled sugar on the floor in a supermarket. I wonder which shopper is making this terrible mess all around the aisles and I decide to search for the one responsible. Suddenly, however, I realise there is a hole in the bag of sugar in \textit{my own} shopping cart. I am the one who is making the mess! I can express what I come to know as:

(1) I am making the mess.

One might think that (1) is the same as the following:

(2) Yujin Nagasawa is making the mess.

According to Grim, however, ‘what I know in knowing (1)’\textsuperscript{5} is different from what I know in knowing (2) because I can know (1) without knowing (2) (and \textit{vice versa}).\textsuperscript{5} What surprises me is not that someone named Yujin Nagasawa
is making the mess but that I am making the mess. If I believed that I was not Yujin Nagasawa but, say, Aristotle, then I would not think that (2) concerns me. But I would be surprised at finding out that I am making the mess. Whoever I think I am, I am surprised by what I know in knowing (1).

If God knows everything knowable, then, according to Grim, He must know what I know in knowing (1) as well as what I know in knowing (2). However, while anyone can know in principle that Yujin Nagasawa is making the mess, which is expressed by (2), no one but I can know what I know in knowing (1). Grim concludes, therefore, that God cannot be omniscient.

The structure of Grim’s argument is as follows:
(3) I know that I am making the mess. (i.e., I know what I know in knowing (1).)
(4) God cannot know what I know in knowing (1).
(5) Therefore, there is something knowable that God cannot know.
(6) Therefore, God cannot be omniscient.

If I know something that God cannot know, it follows that there is at least one knowable thing that is unknown to God, and thus, it would seem, God cannot be omniscient. Given that God is a being such that, if He exists, He knows all there is to know, it appears reasonable to deny the existence of God, as in fact Grim does.

2. Objections to Grim’s argument

As we have seen, Grim’s argument consists only of two premises: (3) and (4). Since (3) is innocuous, it seems that we should focus on (4). In this section, I briefly examine two attempts to undermine (4).

Hector-Neri Castañeda⁷ argues that (4) is false because someone other than me can perfectly well know what I know in knowing (1) by using a ‘quasi-indicator’.⁸ Castañeda’s solution is based on the following assumption:

(P) If a sentence of the form ‘X knows that a person Y knows that ...’ formulates a true statement, then the person X knows the statement formulated by the clause filling the blank ‘...’.⁹

If the sentence ‘I know that Mary knows that the capital city of France is Paris’ formulates a true statement, it follows that I know that the capital city of France is Paris. If the sentence ‘I know that Fred knows that 25 + 12 = 37’ formulates a true statement, it follows that I know that 25 + 12 = 37. Similarly, Castañeda argues, someone else, like God, can know what I know in knowing (1) using a quasi-indexical statement of the form ‘I know
that Yujin Nagasawa knows that he (himself) is making the mess’. (Here ‘he (himself)’ is the quasi-indicator.)

Since Castañeda’s objection has already been criticised elsewhere\textsuperscript{10} I here provide only a small point that might support those criticisms.\textsuperscript{11} Obviously an assumption like (P) is not applicable to so-called ‘know-wh’, such as know-when, know-where, know-who, know-what and know-how. For example, even if the sentence ‘I know that Mary knows how to ride a bicycle’ formulates a true statement it does not follow that I know how to ride a bicycle. Or, to take another example, even if the sentence ‘I know that Fred knows where he hid my book’ formulates a true statement it does not follow that I know where he hid my book. This is why Castañeda formulates (P) so that it is applied only to know-that and know-wh is not so clear. Many philosophers have argued that know-wh (especially know-how) is essentially the same as know-that.\textsuperscript{12} If their arguments are cogent, (P) is false. Given the uncertainty of (P), it is at least not as obvious as Castañeda thinks that God can know exactly what I know in knowing (1) using the quasi-indexical statement.\textsuperscript{13}

John Abbuzzese proposes an alternative way to reject (4). He argues that the difference between what I know in knowing (1) and what God knows in knowing (2) is only the ‘feelings of guilt or embarrassment I experienced’.\textsuperscript{14} Obviously, such feelings have nothing to do with divine omniscience because feelings are not pieces of knowledge. Therefore, Abbuzzese concludes that God, who knows (2), does not fail to know anything.

Abbuzzese, however, misses a crucial point here. The feelings that I come to have upon finding out that I am making the mess do not play a role in Grim’s argument. Grim argues that I can know (2) without knowing (1) (or vice versa) and that my knowing (1) explains my surprise, surprise that my knowing (2) could not explain. Thus, ‘[w]e don’t need feelings to go on to argue that these two pieces of knowledge cannot be the same. The non-identity of discernibles will suffice’.\textsuperscript{15}

Castañeda’s and Abbuzzese’s arguments to undermine (4) are not compelling. Must we then accept Grim’s conclusion that God cannot be omniscient? In what follows I argue that given two plausible principles regarding divine attributes, each of which has been independently motivated, there is no reason to agree with Grim’s conclusion.

3. First principle: Divine omniscience and epistemic powers

The first principle says that a statement about divine omniscience can be restated in terms of a divine epistemic power.\textsuperscript{16} For example, assuming that \( p \) is true, consider the following statement relevant to divine omniscience:
(7) God can know that \( p \).
(7) can be restated as follows:

(8) God has an epistemic power to know that \( p \).
Or, again assuming that \( p \) is true, consider the negation of (7):

(9) God cannot know that \( p \).
(9) can also be restated in terms of an epistemic power:

(10) God does not have an epistemic power to know that \( p \).
Is it also possible to restate a non-modal claim about divine omniscience in terms of an epistemic power? Again assuming that \( p \) is true, consider the following:

(11) God knows that \( p \).
(11) can be restated as follows.

(12) God has, and has exercised, an epistemic power to know that \( p \).
Or, again assuming that \( p \) is true, consider the negation of (11):

(13) God does not know that \( p \).
(13) can also be restated as follows:

(14) Either God does not have an epistemic power to know that \( p \) or, while

God does have such a power, He has not exercised it.

This principle reveals a connection between divine omniscience and omnipotence. The doctrine of divine omnipotence subsumes, by definition, all the powers that God has, such as physical powers, sensory powers, epistemic powers and so on. God does not have, and does not have to have, any more powers than those under the scope of His omnipotence. Hence, divine omniscience can be understood as God’s exercising a particular part – the epistemic part – of His omnipotence.

4. Second principle: Divine omnipotence and necessary impossibilities

The second principle represents a consensus that theologians and philosophers have reached regarding the nature of divine omnipotence. It states that the fact that God does not have a power to do what it is necessarily impossible to do does not undermine His omnipotence.\textsuperscript{17} This principle is described in the following passage by Nick Trakakis:

No matter how much controversy and debate may currently surround the extraordinary attribute of divine omnipotence, there is a virtually complete consensus amongst philosophers and theologians that Aquinas is correct in saying that ‘anything that implies a contradiction does not fall under God’s omnipotence’\textsuperscript{18} . . . (p. 55).\textsuperscript{19}

According to this principle the fact that it is impossible for God, for example, to draw a square circle or to make a married bachelor does not threaten His
omnipotence. As George Mavrodès notes, my failure to draw a circle in a
gometry examination indicates my lack of geometrical skill, but God's, or
anyone's, failure to draw a square circle does not indicate any such lack,\textsuperscript{20} for
it is not merely contingently, but \textit{necessarily impossible} to do.

Obviously, Aquinas, who was not aware of Kripke's distinction between
what is necessary \textit{a priori} and necessary \textit{a posteriori},\textsuperscript{21} had only necessary
\textit{a priori} impossibilities in mind when he formulated the second principle.
However, the principle must be applied to necessary \textit{a posteriori} impossibilities as well, because both of them are equally \textit{necessarily impossible}; that is, \textit{impossible throughout all possible worlds}. Consequently, divine omnipotence
is not undermined even if God cannot bring about such necessary \textit{a posteriori}
implications as separating water from \ce{H_2O} or Hesperus from Phosphorus.

5. Applying the principles

As we have seen, Grim, Castañeda and Abbruzzese have disputed the issue
of whether or not (4) is true. Grim argues that it is true and Castañeda and
Abbruzzese disagree with him. However, a more crucial issue is whether (4),
if it is true, really threatens the traditional doctrine of divine omniscience.

Having in mind the two principles just introduced, consider Grim's argu-
ment again. (4) states that God cannot know what I know in knowing (1).
Emploving the first principle, (4) can be restated as follows:

(15) God does not have an epistemic power to know what I know in
knowing (1).

Now it is clear that Grim's argument is relevant to divine omnipotence as
well. The reason that (4), or equivalently (15), is true, according to Grim, is
that only I can know that I am making the mess. God, or anyone else other
than me, cannot know what I know in knowing (1) simply because they are
not me. There are no other reasons. In general,

(16) If \(s\) is not me then \(s\) cannot know what I know in knowing (1).

(16) is equivalent to the following:

(17) If \(s\) is not me then \(s\) does not have an epistemic power to know what
I know in knowing (1).

Suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that God does have a mira-
culous power to know what I know in knowing (1). Then the following is
ture:

(18) God has an epistemic power to know what I know in knowing (1).

Grim's assumption, exemplified in (17), is logically equivalent to:

(19) If \(s\) has an epistemic power to know what I know in knowing (1) then
\(s\) is me.

Applying (19) to (18) we can derive:

(20) God is me.
However, (20) is false because, obviously, God is not me! Furthermore, (20) is not merely contingently, but is necessarily false. Thus, by assuming that God, as omniscient, must know what I know in knowing (1), Grim requires that God be able to do what it is necessarily impossible to do. However, as we have seen, the second principle states that the fact that God does not have a power to do what it is necessarily impossible to do does not undermine His omnipotence. So even if (4) is true, that is, even if God does not have an epistemic power to know what I know in knowing (1), it does not threaten divine omnipotence. Moreover, since, as I have argued, divine omniscience can be understood as God’s exercising the epistemic part of His omnipotence – the sum of all the powers that He has to have and He actually has – it does not undermine divine omniscience either. Therefore, given the two principles, Grim fails to derive the conclusion that God cannot be omniscient.

6. Possible objections

I now examine four possible objections to my argument.

First, one might claim that my argument is not compelling because it is based on an unusual theistic view of divine omniscience, according to which the doctrine of divine omniscience is a doctrine about divine epistemic powers. While the doctrine of divine omnipotence is construed as being about what God can do, the doctrine of divine omniscience is usually construed as being about what God actually knows and not about what God can know. However, this would appear to make my argument unacceptable to the majority of theists.

I have two responses here. First, the view that I adopt for my argument does not claim that the doctrine of divine omniscience is a doctrine about divine epistemic powers themselves. It rather claims that the doctrine of divine omniscience is a doctrine about God’s exercising His epistemic powers. Second, and more importantly, this claim is consistent with the standard theistic view of divine omniscience. For all it says is that God’s knowing that p can be construed as God’s exercising His epistemic power to know that p, which does not conflict with the standard view.

Second, one might argue that the second principle of my argument is not compelling because God can do what it is necessarily impossible to do. For example, according to Christianity, although God is one entity, He is also a unity of three distinct entities: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. To cite another example, God became a man, Jesus Christ, without sacrificing His divinity at all. One might think that these examples represent necessary impossibilities.

Many Christian philosophers argue that a careful examination shows that those examples do not represent necessary impossibilities. Suppose, though, for the sake of argument, that they are necessary impossibilities.
Then we can reasonably assume that God, who can do what it is necessarily impossible to do, really can know what I know in knowing (1). Yet if He can know what I know in knowing (1) Grim cannot establish his argument in the first place.

Third, one might object to my argument to the effect that the second principle is not applicable to the doctrine of divine omniscience. It is, according to this objection, exclusively applicable to the doctrine of divine omnipotence.

If this objection is right, then the principle needs to be amended to read the fact that God does not have a power to do what it is necessarily impossible to do does not undermine His omnipotence, except that part which involves His epistemic powers. Obviously, this is ad hoc. I do not think that Aquinas or others would have ever meant to limit the principle in this way. It does not make sense to narrow the scope of the principle radically for the sole purpose of blocking my argument. Moreover, if this revised second principle is true then the doctrine of divine omnipotence is easily undermined by the fact that, for instance, God cannot know a false proposition. However, of course, no one, even antitheists, would think that God’s inability to know a false proposition undermines the doctrine of divine omnipotence.

Fourth, one might argue, by appealing to pantheism, that I am wrong in saying that it is necessarily impossible for God to know what I know in knowing (1). Pantheism says that divine unity is constituted by the totality of existence and hence that there is no radical distinction between God and His creation. Thus, given pantheism, my acts could be mine as well as God’s. If my act of making the mess were also God’s, then God would definitely know what I know in knowing (1).

Whatever the merits of this position, it cannot save Grim, for he assumes that God cannot know what I know in knowing (1) precisely because I am distinct from God. This excludes pantheism from the start. If pantheism is right, then God can indeed know what I know in knowing (1) and Grim’s argument fails.

Therefore, even if Grim is right in saying that God cannot know what I know in knowing (1), there is no reason to accept his conclusion that God cannot be omniscient, provided that we accept the two plausible principles regarding divine attributes to which I have appealed.

Notes


2. The term 'knowledge de se' was introduced by Lewis. See David Lewis, 'Attitudes De Dicto and De Se', _Philosophical Review_ 88 (1979), pp. 513–543. Perry uses a more

3. Grim also provides an argument against divine omniscience from knowledge *de presenti*; namely, knowledge of ‘now’. Since that argument involves enormously controversial issues concerning divine timelessness, I focus on his argument from knowledge *de se* in this paper.


6. A precise interpretation of the phrase ‘what I know in knowing (1)’ raises a further issue in the philosophy of language. Grim uses this phrase to denote an object of knowledge. But if objects of knowledge are Russellian propositions, then what I know in knowing (1) just is what I know in knowing (2). It follows that Grim cannot think that objects of knowledge are Russellian propositions. Beyond this, however, Grim remains neutral on the nature of objects of knowledge.


8. In the text I treat Castañeda’s objection as a criticism of Grim’s argument, but in fact, Castañeda’s objection, which is older than Grim’s argument, is intended to undermine Norman Kretzmann’s argument from which Grim derived his basic idea. Kretzmann argues that no one other than Jones can know what the statement ‘Jones knows that he is in a hospital’ describes Jones as knowing. Kretzmann also writes, ‘Anyone could have proved that Descartes existed, but that is not what Descartes proved in the Cogito, and what he proved in the Cogito could not have been proved by anyone else’. See Norman Kretzmann, ‘Omniscience and Immutability’, *Journal of Philosophy* 63 (1966), pp. 409–421.


10. Grim argues against Castañeda as follows. Someone may well know that Yujin Nagasawa knows that he (himself) is making the mess and yet not know what I know in knowing (1). S/he may not know it, according to Grim, if s/he does not know that I am Yujin Nagasawa. See Grim (1985, pp. 162–168). John Abbruzzese contends that Castañeda’s argument is unsuccessful because (P) is subject to counter-examples. For instance, Abbruzzese argues, even if the sentence ‘I know that Dr. Lawless of the Classics Department knows that *vis consili expers mole rutit sua*’ formulates a true statement for someone s/he cannot be said to know that *vis consili expers mole rutit sua* unless s/he knows Latin (pp. 26–28). John

11. I am indebted to Daniel Stoljar on this point.


13. Of course, this is not a knockdown argument against Castaneda's strategy. One may coherently hold that the inapplicability of (P) to know-wh is the very reason that we should not identify know-wh with know-that.


16. For an attempt to define omniscience in terms of power that is slightly different from mine, see Charles Taliaferro, 'Divine Cognitive Power', *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 18 (1985), pp. 133–140.

17. For the application of the second principle to the paradox of the stone see Brown and Nagasawa (2002), and Mavrodes (1963).


22. Here I simply mean that the proposition expressed by (20) is necessarily false.

23. My strategy to undermine Grim's argument is applicable to a number of different further arguments unrelated to the present context. For instance, it can be used to block Thomas Nagel's antiphysicalist argument in the philosophy of mind. Nagel argues that physicalism may be false because there seems no purely physical theory that tells us what it is like for a bat to be a bat whose sensory apparatus is fundamentally different from ours. However, if (a) s has to be a bat in order for s to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat and (b) it is necessarily false that we are bats, then it follows that Nagel is asking physicalists to do what it is necessarily impossible to do. And without assuming both (a) and (b) Nagel cannot motivate the claim that it is impossible for us to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. See Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like To Be A Bat?', *Philosophical Review* 83 (1974), pp. 435–450. Yujin Nagasawa, 'Thomas vs. Thomas: A New Approach to Nagel's Bat Argument', *Inquiry* (forthcoming).

24. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* on this point.

25. It does not follow, however, that my strategy is applicable to any possible argument against the doctrine of divine omniscience. Suppose, for example, that there is an argument that allegedly shows that while God can know that p, He just does not. Since this argument does not commit to a claim that God cannot know that p my argument is not applicable to it.
26. Many philosophers claim that Descartes does believe that God can do what it is necessarily impossible to do. See Harry G. Frankfurt (1964, 1977); Peter Geach, 'Omnipotence'. Philosophy 48 (1973), pp. 7–20; D. Goldstick, 'Could God Make a Contradiction True?'; Religious Studies 26 (1990), pp. 377–387; Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquet University Press, 1980). For example, the following passage by Descartes is said to prove it: 'I do not think that we should ever say of anything that it cannot be brought about by God. For since everything involved in truth and goodness depends on His omnipotence, I would not dare to say that God cannot make a mountain without a valley, or that one and two should not be three. I merely say that He has given me such a mind that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, or an aggregate of one and two which is not three, and that such things involve a contradiction in my conception'. Descartes (1970), pp. 236–237. See also pp. 11–12, 14–15, 150–151, 236–237, 240–241. La Croix argues, however, that Descartes does not really mean to contend that God can turn necessary impossibilities into possibilities. See Richard R. La Croix, 'Descartes on God's Ability to Do the Logically Impossible', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), pp. 455–475.


28. Indeed, Francks argues that cases similar to Grim’s entail a pantheism that is close to Spinoza’s. See Richard Francks, ‘Omniscience, Omnipotence and Pantheism’, Philosophy 54 (1979), pp. 395–399.

29. Throughout this paper I have assumed, for the sake of argument, that Grim is right in contending that God cannot know what I know in knowing (1). It is important to emphasize, however, that my argument is consistent with the claim that ultimately God can know what I know in knowing (1). I am indebted to Thomas Sullivan on this point.

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