Hell and divine reasons for action

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Abstract: Escapism, a theory of hell proposed by Andrei Buckareff and Allen Plug, explicitly relies on claims about divine reasons for action. However, they say surprisingly little about the general account of reasons for action that would justify the inferences in the argument for escapism. I provide a couple of plausible interpretations of such an account and argue that they help revive the ‘Job objection’ to escapism that Buckareff and Plug had dismissed.

Introduction

Andrei Buckareff and Allen Plug have argued for escapism in response to the problem of hell.¹ According to escapism, it is metaphysically and psychologically possible for anyone in hell to be reconciled with God at any time. Others have articulated views of hell that provide for post-mortem reconciliation.² However, what is distinctive about Buckareff and Plug’s argument is that it attempts to make explicit how this view of hell proceeds from what we know about God’s character and motivational states. The argument for escapism relies on claims about God’s reasons for action. Therefore, it is not just that, say, Christians ought to modify their understanding of hell along escapist lines. In addition, Buckareff and Plug’s view is that God has reasons dictating that He more or less align His hell policies with escapism. For God ‘[t]o do otherwise’, they say, ‘would be irrational, given God’s character and reasons for acting’ (48).

Buckareff and Plug consider a number of objections to escapism and to their argument for it. In this paper, I argue that they give short shrift to what they label the ‘Job objection’. Minimally, the Job objection claims that we should be more circumspect in our judgements about God’s reasons for action than Buckareff and Plug are. On their view, the objection relies on

... claims about human fallibility, divine ineffability, and God’s being above reproach – no matter what God does and no matter how bad it may seem to us. In effect,
proponents of such views claim that our limited, mortal perspective does not allow us to make judgements about what God can or should do. (48)

I argue that their response to the Job objection is not sufficient to rule it out. In fact, some of what Buckareff and Plug say by way of support for escapism has the effect, indirectly, of reinforcing the Job objection.

**Escapism**

Buckareff and Plug’s argument for escapism is simple and straightforward:

(1) All of God’s actions are just and loving.
(2) If all of God’s actions are just and loving, then no action of God’s is motivated by an unjust or unloving pro-attitude.
(3) If no action of God’s is motivated by an unjust or unloving pro-attitude, then God’s soteriological activity is motivated by His just and loving pro-attitudes.
(4) If God’s soteriological activity is motivated by His just and loving pro-attitudes, then God’s provision for separation from Him is motivated by God’s desire for the most just and loving state of affairs to be realized in the eschaton.
(5) If God’s provision for separation from Him is motivated by God’s desire for the most just and loving state of affairs to be realized in the eschaton, then God will provide opportunities for people in hell to receive the gift of salvation and such persons can decide to receive the gift.
(6) Therefore, God will provide opportunities for people in hell to receive the gift of salvation and such persons can decide to receive the gift.

(1) is true because, according to traditional theism, God is just and loving. (2)–(5) are reckoned true by Buckareff and Plug in light of God’s reasons for action given His just and loving pro-attitudes. I think that anyone who believes in the God of traditional theism will accept (2) and (3), but I will have more to say about these inferences in the next section. ‘Naïve’ universalists will reject (4) because they deny that God has provided for any human being ever being separated from Him in the afterlife, but ‘sophisticated’ universalists, who might affirm that God provides for some manner or period of separation from Him in the afterlife for people while they are not yet prepared to be reconciled with Him, can accept (4). (4) is most amenable to those with an issuant or choice understanding of hell: the fundamental purpose of hell is to honour the choices of people who prefer not to be in communion with God. Hell issues as a further aspect of His love for His creatures. However, Buckareff and Plug argue that proponents of a retributive view of hell can accept (4) as well, since proponents of retributivism ‘may still
say that God’s love for His creatures plays some role in providing a place of separation’ (43).

Job objectors object to (5). They can accept the antecedent of (5), but even when they do, they will deny its consequent. It is just the sort of statement that Job objectors think we should be more circumspect about asserting. Buckareff and Plug support it primarily by way of analogy between God and a loving person’s continuing desire for reconciliation with his estranged child or unfaithful spouse. A fortiori, God will have such a desire for any of the lost. In fact, God is often presented in certain theistic traditions as with that desire – in the Book of Hosea, or the story of the Prodigal Son, for example. If that is accurate, the only question that remains is whether that desire in God with respect to a person is extinguished after the person’s bodily death. Buckareff and Plug argue that (5) is true because ‘it would be arbitrary and out of character for God to cut off any opportunity for reconciliation and forgiveness at the time of death’ (44). And if (5) is true, then (6) has to be true.

One minor point of clarification is in order before I proceed. (6) reflects a hell policy more or less in line with escapism, but it is not exactly how Buckareff and Plug conceive of escapism. Perhaps this should be obvious because proponents of a retributive view of hell can accept (6) on the basis of (1)–(5), and Buckareff and Plug argue that escapism is incompatible with retributivism. Retributivists can accept (5) and (6) for the same reasons they can accept (4): they can accept that God’s love for His creatures plays at least some role in providing people a place of separation, and that God will at some point provide opportunities for these people to be reconciled with Him. But escapism, according to the way Buckareff and Plug conceive of it, is the conjunction of the following:

(E1) Hell exists and might be populated for eternity;
(E2) If there are any denizens in hell, then they, at any time, have the ability to accept God’s grace and leave hell and enter heaven. (46)

Buckareff and Plug argue that retributivists can accept (E1), but only if they accept that it is possible to continue to sin in hell, and to do so for eternity. They argue that retributivists cannot accept (E2) because it

... is straightforwardly inconsistent with retributivism. According to (E2), a denizen of hell may be able to leave hell at any time and enter heaven. However, if hell is retributive then it is not the case that a resident of hell could leave hell at any time. Rather, he could leave hell only when his punishment was exhausted. (47, emphasis in the original)

The mistake here is to think that the retributive scope of someone’s punishment in hell cannot be exhausted at any time. It is also a mistake to think that the retributive scope of someone’s punishment in hell can be eternal only if he continues to sin in hell, and to do so for eternity. I suspect that Buckareff and Plug are assuming that retributivism requires that the deserved punishment be of a
definite term. Not so. Retributivism only requires that punishment be reserved to persons deserving and that it be proportionate to the person’s desert.

There is no reason retributivists cannot accept, in addition to (5), the idea that the punishment people receive in hell is the occasion for them to repent and receive the gift of salvation, and that people in hell can do so at any time, or never. Proponents of such a view would hold that the retributive scope of the punishment applies to people in hell, and they deserve it, unless and until they have responded appropriately to God’s offer of salvation. They would hold that it is possible, metaphysically and psychologically, for this to happen at any time. If and when it does, these retributivists would hold that time served would be within the proportionate range of punishment required, and so the retributive scope of the punishment is exhausted. Therefore, retributivists can accept (6), as well as full-fledged escapism as Buckareff and Plug conceive of it.7

In this paper, my primary concern is with the argument for (6) and the way Buckareff and Plug respond to the Job objection to (5), rather than the way they conceive of escapism as the conjunction of (E1) and (E2). However, I wanted to note that (6) and the conjunction of (E1) and (E2) are not necessarily as distinct in their consequences for how to think about the purpose of hell as Buckareff and Plug thought. Retributivists can accept it. Buckareff and Plug should be pleased by this, since there is one less reason to reject escapism than they thought. Now, on to God’s reasons for action.

Divine motivation and the Job objection

The distinctiveness of Buckareff and Plug’s argument for escapism is how much it relies on views about divine reasons for action. Unfortunately, however, they say relatively little about the general account of reasons for action that justifies the inferences in the argument for (6), and most importantly, the claim in (5). This is surprising especially given the way that they dismiss the Job objection:

What the Job objection fails to be sensitive to is the nature of practical rationality and the norms that govern rational action. We are claiming, in effect, that God’s practical reasons for acting, that motivate Him to act as He does, are also normative reasons. They do not merely explain why God acts as He does. Reasons for acting, as Stephen Darwall notes, ‘rationally ought to have force for a person and … [they] do for a person who considers them as he rationally ought’. So God ought to act in certain ways if God is rational and has the sort of just and loving character we are claiming that He has …. (48)

The point Buckareff and Plug are making here is an important one. There are many occasions when human beings fail to be motivated to act in line with their genuine reasons for action. David Hume wrote,

A fruit, for instance, that is really disagreeable, appears to me at a distance, and thro’ mistake I fancy it to be pleasant and delicious. Here is one error. I choose
certain means of reaching this fruit, which are not proper for my end. Here is a second error; nor is there any third one that can ever possibly enter into our reasoning concerning actions.8

The first type of mistake is where Hume supposed himself to be motivated to do something by a desire that he would not have had if he had been in a better position to examine the fruit. He supposed himself to be motivated to do something that went contrary to his genuine reasons for action. When subject to this type of mistake, a factual mistake that affects his desires, his actual desires do not provide genuine reasons for action. The second type of mistake is where Hume supposed himself to be motivated to do something by a false belief about what would be sufficient to reach his end. Again, he was not motivated by his genuine reasons for action.

It is now familiar to distinguish between motivating or explanatory reasons for action and normative or justificatory reasons for action.9 In the first of Hume’s examples, he had a motivating reason to go for the fruit, but he did not have a normative reason to go for it. The former constitutes a fact about Hume’s occurrent psychological states. The desire for pleasant and delicious fruit combined with the (false but reasonable) belief that the fruit at a distance is pleasant and delicious explains his motivation to go for it. The latter, normative reason constitutes a fact about Hume’s genuine reasons whatever he was actually motivated to do. When people are subject to the types of mistake highlighted in the example, it will often happen that their motivating reasons will come apart from their normative reasons. Perhaps their normative reasons will come to light after becoming aware of the relevant facts. If Hume bites into the disagreeable fruit, he would experience regret. He might say something like, ‘I really thought I had reason to eat this, but now I know I never really did. It’s disgusting.’ This does not mean that Hume’s action should be subject to the criticism that it was irrational. Rather, in the same way Bernard Williams judged of his famous petrol-and-tonic drinker, although he acted against his genuine reasons, he was, ‘relative to his false belief, acting rationally’.10

The point Buckareff and Plug are making is that God is not ever subject to these types of mistake, or any others, should there be any, and so His normative reasons will always be the things that motivate Him. This means that if God fails to be motivated to act in line with His normative reasons, then God would be subject to the criticism that He is acting irrationally. However, as important a point as this is, it does nothing to show that the ‘Job objection fails to be sensitive to … the nature of practical rationality and the norms that govern rational action’ (48). In fact, this is false. If Job objectors had as their target (2), (3), or even (4), then there might be something to Buckareff and Plug’s complaint about the objection. But Job objectors do not object to (1)–(4)11 or even the claim that if God fails to be motivated to act in line with His normative reasons, then God would be subject to rational criticism. They object to (5).
In addition to making the point that God is never subject to the types of mistake about reasons Hume describes, Buckareff and Plug also say the following about the nature of practical rationality in the context of motivating (2):

Given [that all of God’s actions are just and loving], we can infer that certain things are true of God’s desires and other pro-attitudes in acting as God does. In the etiology of action, some kind of belief-desire complex typically constitutes the reason for acting as one does. Given that God’s character is such that He is just and loving, and given that God’s actions are motivated by His desires and other pro-attitudes that follow from His character, then we can conclude [that if all of God’s actions are just and loving, then no action of God’s is motivated by an unjust or unloving pro-attitude]. (42)

They also rely on claims about God’s desires and other pro-attitudes when attempting to motivate the move from (4) to (5). They cite J. R. Lucas’s claim that ‘[t]here is an antecedent desire on God’s part to identify and be identified with us, which leads him to seek both to establish and restore his relationship with us’ (44). They write, ‘God’s desire for a restored relationship with us, His estranged children, should lead God to adopt policies in the eschaton that would reflect such a desire and other pro-attitudes’ (44).

Buckareff and Plug, in this inference to (5), and those in (1)–(4), are relying on a kind of reasons internalism. According to a pretty generic version of this view, if an agent has a genuine reason for acting, then, necessarily, the agent must at least be capable of being motivated to act in line with that reason. If the agent believes that there is a reason for him to act a certain way, but is in no way motivated to act in that way, then the agent is not fully rational. So, if God had a reason to act a certain way, but He was not at all motivated to act in that way, then God would not be fully rational. Buckareff and Plug think God is fully rational. They claim that His (motivating and normative) reasons for action, given His just and loving pro-attitudes, dictate hell policies more or less in line with escapism. Therefore, God must have aligned His hell policies more or less in line with escapism.

Job objectors can accept (1)–(4), but those facts about God’s reasons do not mean that He will provide opportunities for people in hell to receive the gift of salvation, and Job objectors offer reasons for thinking that we should be more circumspect about assertions like this. Job objectors can accept that God’s provision for separation from Him is motivated by His desire for the most just and loving state of affairs to be realized in the eschaton, and remain sceptical about (5) and the claim that God’s reasons for adopting something like escapism make it the case that He rationally and morally ought adopt something like escapism. For example, Job objectors could allow that God has pro tanto reasons for adopting a hell policy in line with escapism, and therefore, it would be pro tanto irrational for Him to do otherwise. They could accept this for the reasons Buckareff and Plug enumerate: viz. ‘if we believe that a parent is morally obligated always to be willing to receive her estranged child, and forgive him if he asks for forgiveness, then why shouldn’t we expect the same from God?’ (44).
However, Job objectors will also accept that there could actually be an answer to this question: that doing otherwise could be responsive to other normative reasons that God has, but which are anything but obvious to us. Citing human fallibility, divine ineffability, and God’s being above reproach, they will deny that we have adequate grounds for claiming that God has all-things-considered reasons for adopting policies consistent with escapism. This might be wrong, but Buckareff and Plug have not shown that it is wrong. More importantly, they have not shown that this involves any misunderstanding on the part of Job objectors of the nature of practical rationality or the norms that govern rational action.

This is not all. It is less familiar than the distinction between explanatory and justificatory reasons, but certainly not unfamiliar, that reasons internalism is ambiguous between a truth-making and a tracking account of reasons for action. Both have it that someone’s being motivated to do some action is necessary for his having a genuine reason to do that action. However, the former is subjectivist in the sense that, according to this interpretation, what makes it the case that someone has a genuine or normative reason for action is that he has a relevantly informed pro-attitude or desire for performing the action. That is the view that Hume and Williams seem inclined towards. Williams writes, ‘A has a reason to \( \Phi \) only if he could reach the conclusion to \( \Phi \) by a sound deliberative route from the motivations he already has.’ God, then, would have a normative reason for bringing His hell policies more or less in line with escapism only if doing so is instrumental in furthering some antecedent desire or other type of pro-attitude of His.

According to the latter, tracking interpretation, someone’s desires or pro-attitudes, even those possessed in light of all the relevant information, are not what makes it the case that he has a genuine reason for action; rather, these informed desires or pro-attitudes are reliable signals of what his genuine reasons for action are. They track his objective reasons. For example, according to Michael Smith’s account of reasons for action, all ideally rational agents will converge on the same desires, which are necessary and sufficient for having genuine reasons to act in line with those desires. Smith claims that the most likely explanation for this fact is that there are ‘extremely unobvious moral truths’ that make it the case that the agent has reason to act that way. If this is the correct interpretation, then God’s antecedent desires or other pro-attitudes do not make it the case that He has genuine reasons for action. Instead, His genuine reasons are grounded in facts about, say, what brings about the most just and loving state of affairs in the eschaton.

This ambiguity in reasons internalism raises a Euthyphro-type question that Buckareff and Plug do not directly address: Do God’s desires or other pro-attitudes make it the case that He has a genuine reason for acting in line with those states of mind, or do they, instead, track facts about His genuine reasons? Indirectly, however, they seem to give conflicting advice about which way to go.
On the one hand, for example, I noted above that they approvingly cite Lucas’s view of the structure of divine motivation, which relies on the idea that ‘[t]here is an antecedent desire on God’s part’ (44). Buckareff and Plug say that this desire is for the most just and loving state of affairs to be realized in the eschaton. This view seems to favour the truth-making account. God’s desires or other pro-attitudes make it the case that He has a genuine reason for acting in line with the most just and loving state of affairs.

On the other hand, when responding to the Job objection, Buckareff and Plug say that God has ‘moral obligations that provide Him with moral reasons for acting [which] do not differ from ours’ (48). This suggests more that God will have desires and other pro-attitudes that perfectly track His moral obligations or moral reasons for acting, which, presumably, are determined by facts about what brings about the most just and loving state of affairs. Or, unless this claim does suggest the tracking account, Buckareff and Plug would have to say that God’s moral obligations are determined by his desires and other pro-attitudes.

Whether Buckareff and Plug would ultimately endorse the truth-making account or the tracking account, it seems that, either way, Job objectors are in a very good position to reassert their concerns about claims like (5). It may be that God’s provision for separation from Him is motivated by His desire for the most just and loving state of affairs to be realized in the eschaton; but that does not mean that God will provide opportunities for people in hell to receive the gift of salvation and such persons can decide to receive the gift. The claim that our view of moral goodness, or of what it means to be just and loving, points in that direction, even if true, does not mean that (5) is true. Again, God’s motivating reasons are always also normative reasons for acting, but this is not true about human beings.

There are many occasions when human beings fail to be motivated to act in line with their genuine reasons for action. We are prone to error even when we are being reasonably reflective about our genuine reasons. Both truth-making internalism and tracking internalism, as accounts of genuine reasons for action, have to be sensitive to this fact about human beings. Both accounts reflect their sensitivity to this fact by tying genuine reasons for action to the desires or other pro-attitudes of agents, not as they actually are, but if were they idealized in the relevant respects.

As I explained above, truth-making internalists say that what makes it the case that someone has a genuine reason for action is that he has a relevantly informed pro-attitude or desire for performing the action. The relevant idealization process might, for example, correct for mistaken beliefs and any errors of instrumental reasoning in order to uncover the person’s genuine reasons for action. Tracking internalists say that the desires and other pro-attitudes of idealized agents provide reliable directional markers to their genuine reasons for action. In contrast to the truth-making account, the tracking account allows that desires and other pro-attitudes can be subject to rational criticism solely on the basis of their content.
In that case, the desires and other pro-attitudes of ideally rational agents might be expected to converge after undergoing the relevant idealization process.

God, however, requires no such process. His desires and other pro-attitudes that motivate His actions are already ideal. Only we humans require an idealization process in order to discover our genuine reasons. Buckareff and Plug actually seem to endorse this idea. They say the following in the context of responding to an objection unrelated to the Job objection:

Some persons have ill-feeling towards God, desire not to be with God, are not prepared to let go of whatever may be impeding their ability to make the right decision, etc. A change within such persons should perhaps not be expected in the afterlife. To be reconciled with God is to fulfil the goal of human life ... ‘to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever’. To glorify God, Cornelius Plantinga notes, is to share God’s intentions and purposes God has that His intentions represent. He writes that, ‘To enjoy God forever is to cultivate a taste for this project, to become more and more the sort of person for whom eternal life with God would be sheer heaven.’ (50)

The traditional Christian view is that no one is entirely like this in their earthly existence; but that this idealized state is attained with what Christians call glorification or final sanctification. Only at that point do people converge on the ideal set of desires and pro-attitudes and fully appreciate all their genuine reasons for action. We ‘become conformed to the image of His Son’.

This suggests that whether God’s desires or other pro-attitudes make it true that He has the reasons He has, or track the reasons He has, our genuine reasons for acting will conform to God’s, or alternatively they will conform to those of the ideal servant of God. Or, this would at least be true of our moral reasons for action. It is possible someone might defend a subjectivist view about genuine reasons along side an objectivist view about moral reasons. This combination of views would imply that a person might have genuine reasons to be immoral. But, whether or not this is plausible thing to say about genuine human reasons, given God’s nature, it seems implausible to hold such a view about His. Not only is it that His motivating reasons for action never come apart from His normative reasons for action, they never come apart from His moral reasons for action either.

This means that Job objectors could very well agree that, as we have seen Buckareff and Plug claim, ‘God’s moral obligations that provide Him with moral reasons for acting do not differ from ours’ (48). Job objectors can agree that our moral reasons for action are the same as God’s, but in our earthly existence we only have an imperfect grasp of what our true moral reasons are. Prior to undergoing the relevant idealization process we might not be in a very good position to know what our moral reasons for action are. Therefore, the fact that they do not differ from God’s does not tell us much about what God’s moral reasons for action are, and it does seem presumptuous boldly to make claims about what God should do with respect to His hell policies.
The obvious fall-back position for escapists is Buckareff and Plug's assumption that if God deviates from the sort of behaviour we expect of an earthly parent, then God would be violating one of His moral obligations. That is, even if they concede to Job objectors that we have a relatively imperfect grasp of our moral reasons, they would still attempt to support the inference from (4) to (5) by insisting that certain possible divine post-mortem policies amount to flouting moral obligations and acting contrary to God's moral reasons. This is because we can know that if we acted similarly then we would be acting contrary to our moral reasons.17

However, the parental analogy is limited. I think I have at least a pretty good grasp of my moral reasons in my capacity as an earthly parent. But I have a less clear idea of what moral reasons a pan-omni being with responsibility for the trillions of people who have and will exist would have. Furthermore, it is not just the numbers involved that could make a difference. God's moral reasons that affect His hell policies could also depend on facts about other of His intentions, purposes, and projects that He has, but which we either are ignorant of or need, as Plantinga said, to cultivate a taste for, and can only wholeheartedly endorse in glory. So there are relevant disanalogies. What the most just and loving state of affairs looks like in the eschaton could look a lot different, because it depends on a lot more factors, than what the most just and loving state of affairs looks like in my household.

Minimally, though, I have shown that internalism about reasons does not undermine the Job objection. In fact, not only is it false that Job objectors misunderstand the nature of practical reason, it turns out that more scrupulous attention to the nature of practical reason can actually support the Job objection to escapism and specifically the idea that we should be more circumspect in our judgements about God's reasons for action.

Notes
1. Andrei Buckareff and Allen Plug 'Escaping hell: divine motivation and the problem of hell', Religious Studies, 41 (2005), 39–54. All in-text references are to this article.
3. This argument is presented, along with explanatory comments in support of the premises, on 42–45 of Buckareff and Plug 'Escaping hell: divine motivation and the problem of hell'.
4. The characterization of different versions of universalism as ‘naïve’ and ‘sophisticated’ comes from Michael Murray 'Three versions of universalism', Faith and Philosophy, 16 (1999), 55–68.
5. Or consider Robin Williams's character ‘Chris’ in the 1998 film What Dreams May Come, who left a heavenly realm (not considering it something to be grasped?) in order to rescue his wife from hell.
6. Alternatively, continuing to fail to repent and receive the gift of salvation might be considered continuing to sin.
7. An anonymous referee for this journal suggests that my claim is in tension with the lex talionis, but allows that the doctrine may not be an essential component of retributivism. I certainly agree that the lex talionis is not essential to retributivism. Retributivism is a view about what makes punishment justified, appropriate, or required. The view justifies punishment on the basis of the offenders deserving
it. The *lex talionis* provides a kind of metric for determining the amount or character of the punishment offenders should receive. According to the most demanding version, the punishment should reflect the character of the offence by doing to offenders precisely what they have done to their victims. However, this need not be what the *lex talionis* requires. Many have made the point that it rather establishes the upper limit to the amount or seriousness of punishment in order to avoid further escalation of hostilities. Either way, understood as a way of determining an offender’s desert, the *lex talionis* is a kind of proportionality principle. So there is no tension between my understanding of retributivism and the *lex talionis*. There could be a tension between the details of the retributive view I say the escapist can accept and the *lex talionis*, but only if the latter is understood in the most demanding way. Thanks to C. L. Ten for a helpful discussion about punishment theory.


11. This is subject to the qualification concerning (4) that the Job objector is not also a naïve universalist.


13. The reasons are objective in the sense that they depend on how things actually are. However, on subjectivist accounts, an agent’s reasons for action depend on how things actually are with the agent’s desires or other pro-attitudes, or, rather, how things would be with his desires were the agent relevantly informed.


16. Romans 8.29.

17. Thanks to Andrei Buckareff for pressing me on this.