WILLIAM E. MANN
University of Vermont

SIMPLICITY AND PROPERTIES: A REPLY TO MORRIS

The doctrine of divine simplicity, the doctrine that God has no physical or metaphysical complexity whatsoever, is not a doctrine designed to induce immediate philosophical acquiescence. There are severe questions about its coherence. And even if those questions can be answered satisfactorily in favour of the doctrine, there remains the question why anyone should accept it. Thomas V. Morris raises both sorts of questions about a version of the doctrine which I have put forward. In the following pages I shall respond to what I take to be the most serious of Morris’s objections. I shall argue that the doctrine survives Morris’s onslaught, but that one observation of his points it in a direction I had hitherto not taken seriously. The bulk of Morris’s paper raises questions of the first sort; perforce the bulk of my paper will also. I shall offer, at the end, a reason for thinking that neither of us is yet in a position to pronounce categorically on the second question. My remarks in this paper constitute an interim report on how I think things presently stand with divine simplicity.

I. THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION

There appear to be two versions of the doctrine of divine simplicity as it applies to God’s attributes. One version, the ‘property view’, identifies God with the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, and the like, from whence it follows that the divine attributes are all really identical (so that, for example, omniscience = omnipotence), and that God is a property. The latter conclusion especially is outrageous enough to suggest scrapping the property view out of hand.

The ‘property instance view’, which I have defended, holds more initial promise. It identifies God with his own omniscience, his own omnipotence, and the like, where, for example, ‘the omniscience of God’ is construed as referring to an instance of the property being omniscient. The property instance

view maintains that ‘God’, ‘the omniscience of God’, and ‘the omnipotence of God’ all refer to the same property instance, namely, God. Against the possible objection that no property instance could be a person, I have argued on behalf of the property instance view that on the contrary, every person is an instance of a rich property, a conjunctive property whose conjuncts are all and only the essential and accidental properties of that person.\(^1\) There are more ramifications of the property instance view, but we have enough before us to begin to consider Morris’s objections.

II. RICH PROPERTIES

Morris balks at the notion of a rich property. He offers two arguments against the notion. Both of them rest on confusions.

Here is Morris’s first objection.

I am supposed to be an instance of my rich property. And my rich property is supposed to be composed of all my properties. If this is supposed to be inclusive of all the properties I ever will have, a problem arises. For presumably I shall exemplify next year properties I do not now have. There are then components of my rich property which will not have instances in my case until next year. But if a rich property just is a conjunctive property composed, and one assumes, composed essentially, of its conjunct properties, then it stands to reason that the existence of an instance of a rich property essentially depends on the instantiation of each of its conjunct properties. So if some of my rich property’s conjuncts are not yet instantiated in my case, no instance of my rich property yet exists. And if I am an instance of my rich property, I do not yet exist. (303–4)

Consider the following analogy. You are watching one of your favourite movies, perhaps Alfred Hitchcock’s Rear Window. Your friend, Maurice, tries to persuade you that what you are seeing on the screen really is not Hitchcock’s movie. As you are watching James Stewart and Grace Kelly embrace, Maurice points out that Rear Window also has a scene, coming up later, in which Stewart grapples with Raymond Burr. Since the latter scene is an essential part of Rear Window, and since Rear Window just is a sequence of its scenes, Maurice concludes that what you are seeing is one (fleeting) scene from Rear Window. You are not seeing Rear Window at the present moment, nor at any other moment. To see Rear Window at a moment, you would have to see all the scenes at once, and that clearly is not what you are seeing now.

The proper reply to Maurice is to insist that you are at the present moment watching Rear Window, and that to see Rear Window at the present moment just is to see this scene with Stewart and Kelly in isolation from the scenes that precede and follow it. The alternative which Maurice puts forward would not be a case of your watching Rear Window at all, but rather a case of your seeing an unintelligible, multiply exposed mess. Or, to put it another

way, Maurice’s alternative would be the way in which an *eternal* being would experience *Rear Window*, but without the confusion attending your so experiencing it. And while that is true, it only serves to underscore one of the differences between the way experiences are realized in an eternal being and the way they are realized in timebound creatures.

I trust that the application of the analogy to Morris’s argument is clear. At the present moment I am instantiating my rich property by writing these words. It cannot further be required of me that, in order to instantiate my rich property, I must simultaneously be writing ‘Divine Simplicity’ along with the words, whatever they may be, for the last paragraph of this paper. Perhaps there is some being who does all of this simultaneously. Perhaps, in some possible world, I am that being. The point remains, however, that that being instantiates a different rich property from the one that I am instantiating in the actual world. Morris’s argument seems to commit a fallacy of composition, arguing illicitly from ‘I do not presently instantiate every property in my rich property’ to ‘I do not presently instantiate my rich property’.

There is a second alleged dire consequence involving rich properties. Once again, in Morris’s words:

The property of having written on simplicity is surely not one of [Mann’s] essential properties. But it is one of the conjunct properties in his rich property, liberally conceived. If we understand a rich property to be individuated by means of, and to be essentially related to, its conjunct properties, and view a property instance as a sort of thing which is essentially tied to the property of which it is an instance, then the commonly accepted and quite reasonable view that all metaphysical identities are necessary precludes one from holding both that Mann is identical with what is as a matter of fact his rich property instance and that he could have avoided ever tangling with simplicity. If an individual’s rich property is understood to involve all its properties, then one can identify an individual with the exemplification of its rich property only on pain of holding all its properties to be essential. (304)

Let us call my rich property ‘*R*’. I am then an instance of *R*. Morris claims that it follows on my conception of a rich property that I cannot have any accidental properties, that all my properties are essential to me; equivalently, that I cannot have instantiated any other rich property. Stripped to its essentials, Morris’s argument consists of three premises which entail the conclusion he wishes to pin on me.

(P1) It is necessarily the case that *R* contains exactly the properties that *R* contains.

(P2) It is necessarily the case that if *x* is an instance of *R*, then *x* instantiates exactly the properties that *R* contains.

(P3) It is necessarily the case that I am an instance of *R*.

Thus: (C) It is necessarily the case that I instantiate exactly the properties that *R* contains.

(P2) and (P3) alone suffice to entail (C). (P1) blocks the possibility of my
instantiating $R$ by instantiating some other conjunction of properties. Morris's intuition is that it is an identity condition on any rich property that it have the conjunct properties it has: delete, augment, or substitute any conjunct property in a rich property and you have a different rich property. In a similar vein, the intuition behind $(P_2)$ is that it is an identity condition on property instances that they instantiate all and only the conjunct properties of their associated rich property. If some property instance were to instantiate all of $R$'s conjunct properties, save one, or all of $R$'s conjunct properties, plus one, it simply would not be an instance of $R$.

For present purposes I see no reason to quarrel with $(P_1)$ or $(P_2)$. $(P_3)$ is another matter. There is no reason at all to accept $(P_3)$. In other possible worlds I instantiate other rich properties, at least so far as accidental properties are concerned. In some of those worlds, for instance, I refrain from writing on divine simplicity. (Perhaps they are better worlds for that fact, but our present concern is metaphysics, not theodicy.) So it is not necessarily the case that I instantiate $R$. It is true, of course, that I instantiate $R$ in the actual world. I reject $(P_3)$ but accept

$(P_3')$ I am (contingently) an instance of $R$.

But $(P_3')$ does not yield $(C)$; it gives us instead

$(C')$ I (contingently) instantiate exactly the properties that $R$ contains. And $(C')$ is harmless.

Morris seems to think that $(P_3')$ cannot be a contingent identity. That may be the import of his remark that 'all metaphysical identities are necessary'. I do not know what a 'metaphysical identity' is, but if Morris's thesis is true, then $(P_3')$ is not a metaphysical identity. It is nevertheless an identity, probably best expressed by

$(P_3^*)$ Mann is the being who instantiates $R$,

although we should note that $(P_3^*)$ assumes something that $(P_3')$ does not, namely that only one being instantiates $R$ in the actual world (an assumption one must make if one accepts the Identity of Indiscernibles). Since $(P_3^*)$ is an identity joining a rigid and a non-rigid designator, it is contingent.

I conclude, then, that Morris's arguments do not impugn the metaphysical integrity of the notion of a rich property.

III. PROBLEMS WITH PROPERTIES

Morris points out that on both versions of divine simplicity, there can be at most one property either with which God is identical (the property view) or of which he is an instance (the property instance view). Thus the rich property associated with God is a particularly truncated one. Now this fact, according to Morris, spawns a number of objections to one or the other or both versions of the doctrine of divine simplicity. For openers there is the problem of modal uniformity. Or rather, there are two problems of modal
uniformity, one for God, one for creatures. The problem of modal uniformity in the case of God arises in the following way, according to Morris:

God's properties obviously cannot differ among themselves in modal status if he has in reality only one property. But theists traditionally hold that God is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and good, yet only contingently or accidentally such that he created this world, called Abram out of Ur, spoke through Moses, and so forth. It follows from Mann's account of divine simplicity, as well as from the property view, that no such modal discriminations can be made with respect to God. And surely this is unacceptable. (307)

The problem of modal uniformity with respect to creatures takes this shape:

[C]onsider any exemplification of an apparently accidental or contingent property. God will have the property of knowing this property to be exemplified. And this piece of knowledge will be identical to his omniscience. Thus, it will be essential to him. But if this is so, and God is a necessarily existing being, it will be a necessary truth that the original, apparently contingent property is exemplified, and that it is exemplified by the particular object which otherwise appeared accidentally to have it. It then follows of course that the actual world is the only possible world, that all our properties are essential, and so on. (311)

And then there is the problem of supervenient properties, which can be paraphrased in this way. Surely God is omniscient. Now the property of being omniscient either supervenes on infinitely many properties like knowing that Mann writes on simplicity from September to December 1980 or it is identical with that particular property. If it supervenes, then God has many properties and so is not simple. But the two properties cannot be identical; they are not even coextensive. And so, since they are not identical, and God has them both, it follows again that he is not simple (307–8). Finally, there is the divine uniqueness problem, which I can put this way. Suppose that God has a property which is unique to him, for example, the property of existing a se. On any orthodox understanding of aseity, any instance of that property would have in turn the property of being an instance of a property unique to God. In that case the property instance view of divine simplicity along with Leibnitz's Law entails that there is no property which God has that he shares with anything else. On the other hand, if he has no property unique to him, it follows that all his properties are shared. So either none of his properties is shared or they all are, and that amounts to 'relinquishing...the substance of traditional theism' (314).

All these problems get off the ground by making liberal use of an assumption which, at the very least, one need not make. The assumption is never articulated by Morris, and so it is difficult to say just what precise shape the assumption takes for him. But I would suggest this as a first-stab approximation: almost any well-formed gerundive construction refers to a property, and non-synonymous gerundive constructions refer to different properties.¹ Thus in the

¹ I say 'almost any' to exclude on Morris's behalf cases like being non-self-exemplified, which of course generates the property-theoretic version of Russell's Paradox. Philip Quinn first called this example to my attention.
course of Morris's paper we find that all the following are alleged to refer to properties:

(R 1) being such that he created this world
(R 2) being such that he called Abram out of Ur
(R 3) being such that he spoke through Moses
(E 1) knowing that Mann writes on simplicity from t_1-t_n
(T 1) being self-identical
(T 2) being such that 2 + 2 = 4
(T 3) having some property
(E 2) being such that his omniscience has the content that it as a matter of fact

(R 4) being an instance of a property had only by God.

Morris needs to have such properties if he is to make the modal uniformity, supervenience, and divine uniqueness problems work. But why should we think that there are such properties? Why should we accept the 'gerundive assumption' or any assumption close to it? Morris offers us no help in answering these questions, except to claim that a view which countenances such properties is the 'standard and powerful view of properties', which 'it would take quite a bit of argument to dislodge' (314).

There is no 'standard' view of properties held by philosophers. What one finds instead are competing theories, ranging from the lush and giddy platonism codified in the gerundive assumption to the astringent nominalism of Nelson Goodman. Morris is of course entitled to choose any theory he wishes to defend, and even to call it, tendentiously, the 'standard view'. But if his view entails that the candidates given in the list above are properties, then it offers no claim to our philosophical assent. Philosophers are familiar with ersatz cases of change, cases of 'mere-Cambridge change'. I shall argue that the members of the list are mere-Notre Dame properties, that is, not properties at all. I have labelled each member of the list according to a taxonomy which will enable us to examine the list systematically.

Let us begin with (T 1), (T 2), and (T 3). Morris characterizes them as 'trivial' properties, apparently because he thinks that they are properties shared by everything. Since the alleged properties are necessarily co-extensive yet not identical, Morris's view must be that properties are individuated by some (unspecified) intensional principle. My guess is that the principle is close enough to the gerundive assumption to yield the result that the putative property being such that 2 + 2 = 4 is distinct from the putative property being such that 2 + 3 = 5, which in turn is distinct from the putative property being such that 2 + 3 = 5 or the square root of 2 is rational. If so, then it follows that everything has non-denumerably many properties. Now there is nothing logically untoward about this consequence. Nevertheless, one does not need to be a nominalist to protest about the extravagance of such a view. Trivial properties have no explanatory value whatsoever. They are causally
Simplicity and Properties

inert and undetectable in principle by any kind of experimental means. It may be replied that of course all this is true; that is just what makes them trivial. But their alleged existence seems to rest on a bad argument at best. One begins with a sentence that is true, for example, ‘Jones is such that $2 + 2 = 4$’. One then abstracts a gerundive clause from it, being such that $2 + 2 = 4$, appeals to the gerundive assumption or one of its unlovable associates, and presto! – one has a trivial property. Perhaps one even claims that some such property is required to give a rigorous semantic account of the truth of the sentence one begins with. The claim is false. ‘Jones is such that $2 + 2 = 4$’ is true in virtue of the fact that $2 + 2 = 4$, not in virtue of any property that Jones has.

Perhaps the defenders of trivial properties have other arguments. The burden of proof is surely on them. It is notoriously difficult to refute categorically any metaphysical theory. I cannot claim to have refuted the existence of trivial properties. I can fairly claim to have shown that there is so far utterly no motivation to accept them, and some reason to reject them.

(R1), (R2), and (R3) are all examples of so-called relational properties. (R4) is a bit different, but its treatment will be similar to the others. Relational properties are mere-Notre Dame properties. It is true that God called Abram out of Ur. The truth of that proposition, however, does not require the existence of a property like (R2). Moreover, to think that it does is most likely the result of confusing properties with entities of some other ontological category. The most natural thing to say, when confronted with the sentence ‘God called Abram out of Ur’, is that it reports an action of God’s, his calling Abram out of Ur. Is there, corresponding to the action of calling Abram out of Ur, the property of being such that one calls Abram out of Ur? Suppose I sink the 5-ball in the corner pocket. Do I, in virtue of that fact, have the property of being such that I sink the 5-ball in the corner pocket? As I chalk the cue for my next shot, do I now have the property of being such that I have already sunk the 5-ball in the corner pocket? I suppose that one can insist that these really are properties – one might even try to identify actions with properties – but no one is obliged to follow suit. We can give an intuitively more satisfactory account of my pool-hall career by citing the actions I perform, rather than the properties I possess. In similar fashion, (R1), (R2), and (R3), when embedded back into the sentences about God from which they have been abstracted, refer to actions of his. Or, to put it more accurately from the point of view of the doctrine of divine simplicity, they refer to one and the same free, eternal activity of God’s, which has as its effects that this world was created, that Abram was called out of Ur, and that Moses was spoken to.

The general situation with alleged relational properties ascribed to God is more complex than I have indicated, however. For example, it is less obvious that a sentence like ‘God is lord of the people of Israel’ records an
action of his. But it does not follow that it picks out a contingent property of his, being lord of the people of Israel. Quid perfect being, God is sovereign over all things. Let us call all the creatures in the actual world, past, present, and future, the actual field of God’s sovereignty. Included in the actual field are the people of Israel. If God had ordained things differently, there might have been no people of Israel: the actual field would not then have contained them. That the people of Israel are in the actual field is a contingent fact. That God is sovereign is not a contingent fact. He would have been sovereign over any field of creatures he might have created. The fact that God is lord of the people of Israel is not to be explained by appealing to the mere-Notre Dame property, being lord of the people of Israel – that would explain nothing – but rather by the facts that God is necessarily sovereign and that the people of Israel exist contingently.

We can now see how to consign \((R_4)\) to the realm of mere-Notre-Dame-propertihood. Suppose that Rosie is the only red thing in the world. In virtue of that fact we should not infer that Rosie’s redness has the further property of being an instance of a property had only by Rosie. The fact that Rosie’s redness is an instance of a property had only by Rosie is explained by the facts that Rosie is red and that nothing else is. Similarly, the fact that God’s asenity is (necessarily) unique to him is explained by the facts that God is (necessarily) a se and that (necessarily) nothing else is a se. No occult property like \((R_4)\) is needed or welcome.

\((E_1)\) and \((E_2)\) are cases of putative epistemic properties. We could subsume \((E_1)\) and \((E_2)\) under the class of alleged relational properties and dismiss them in the same way we drummed out being lord of the people of Israel. Problems of intentional inexistence would not arise here, since \((E_1)\) and \((E_2)\) both involve items of knowledge as opposed to items of mere belief. But I shall discuss a more elaborate way to eliminate \((E_1)\) and \((E_2)\) as properties of God. Although more elaborate, it has the virtue of displaying more implications of the doctrine of divine simplicity.

Let us examine \((E_1)\) first. If \(p\) is some proposition, is knowing that \(p\) a property? The answer to this question depends on the answer, or answers, one gives to an antecedent question, namely, how is the knowledge that \(p\) realized in the knower? Suppose that Jones, an ordinary human, knows that \(p\). Now Jones may know that \(p\) either occurrently or dispositionally. It may be, that is, that he is consciously believing that \(p\) or it may be that \(p\) is an item in Jones’s memory which could be brought to conscious belief in the right circumstancnes. In either case there are other factors that make his believing that \(p\) a case of knowing that \(p\), such as \(p\)’s being true, Jones’s being justified, and/or Jones’s having acquired the belief that \(p\) by means of a reliable process. Now the way in which these other factors are realized in an epistemic agent may vary from agent to agent. Jones may know that \(p\) because he sees that \(p\), whereas Smith may know that \(p\) because she accepts the testimony of Jones, a reliable agent. I have argued elsewhere that even
the truth that \( p \) is realized differently in one epistemic agent, God, from the way in which it is realized in others.\(^1\) For present purposes, however, we can concentrate on the belief component of knowledge. If \( p \) is an item of Jones’s dispositional or latent knowledge, then it is reasonable to say that Jones is in a certain cognitive state, the state of believing that \( p \). It seems defensible, furthermore, to claim that cognitive states are properties, and so to conclude that believing that \( p \) is a property. We should note, however, that even if we accept the analysis just given, all we are entitled to say in this case is that believing that \( p \), as realized in Jones, is a property of Jones.

Suppose, in contrast, that Smith believes that \( p \) currently. Suppose that she believes that \( p \) because she sees that \( p \). In this case there is a cognitive process involved, visual perception. It is possible to view the belief that \( p \) as a product of that process, and thus as a cognitive state. But it is not necessary to do so. Many cognitive theorists identify the occurrent belief with the cognitive process in such a way that Smith’s currently believing that \( p \) just is (contingently) her seeing that \( p \). Now only those caught in the grip of a theory will identify processes with properties. In Smith’s case, then, believing that \( p \) is not a property of Smith.

One of the corollaries of the doctrine of divine simplicity is the thesis that God is pure actuality, containing no trace of potentiality.\(^2\) It follows that none of God’s beliefs is dispositional; they are all occurrent. His believing that \( p \), then, can be identified with a cognitive process of his. A defender of the doctrine of divine simplicity will in fact identify God’s believing that \( p \) with his knowing that \( p \) with his willing that \( p \), all of which are the same activity, characterized in different ways.\(^3\) We can conclude that knowing that \( p \), as it is realized in God, is not a property.

We can now quickly deliver the coup de grâce to (E2). God’s being such that his omniscience has the content that it has just is God’s knowing that \( p \) and that \( q \) and so on, for all true propositions. We can go further and say that God’s activity of knowing that \( p \) is his activity of knowing that \( q \) and so on. There is no evidence of a property lurking here. (E2), like all its confrères, is a mere-Notre Dame property.

IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION REVISITED

Can it be that all the arrows from Morris’s quiver have missed their mark? In a word, ‘No’. There is one observation early in Morris’s paper which tells against the property instance view, taken in isolation from the property view. If one thinks of the doctrine of divine simplicity as motivated by considerations of divine sovereignty and aseity, then, as Morris points out,  


\(^3\) For further explication of this claim, see ‘Epistemology Supernaturalized’ and my ‘Modality, Morality, and God’ (in preparation).
The property instance view will not do the job. For it allows that there is at least one property existing distinct from God as an abstract object on which God is, in some sense, dependent for what he is — an instance of that property. (302)

It looks as though a simplicist is confronted with a dilemma. If he adopts the property instance view, then he violates the thesis that God exists a se. If he adopts the property view, then he is subject to the withering scorn heaped on that view by Alvin Plantinga. Recall that chief among Plantinga’s criticisms is the claim that the property view transforms God into a property, a bloodless abstract object that could not have created the world, care for us, and so forth.

I now think that the best way to handle the dilemma is to grasp both its horns. The property instance view identifies God with, for example, his own omniscience. The property view identifies God with omniscience itself. What I propose is to identify God’s omniscience with omniscience itself. The proposed identity has the following immediate consequences. First, it obviates Morris’s objection. If God and his omniscience just are omniscience itself, then there is no property distinct from God of which he is an instance. Second, since the property of omniscience is identified with its instance, God, it follows that if we are monotheists we will be committed to holding that omniscience either is not or cannot be replicated, depending on the modal strength of our monotheism. Analogous remarks will hold for omnipotence and the other standard divine attributes. This result should not be unwelcome, although it does not prevent one from searching for independent arguments to the same effect.

There is still Plantinga’s criticism leering at us. Note, however, that the criticism takes effect only by its relying on an unspoken assumption, namely, that properties are abstract objects, incapable of the personal attributes essential to a traditional conception of God. I do not accept the assumption. Properties, I am inclined to believe, are causal powers. \( P \) is a property of an object, \( x \), only if \( P \)’s presence in \( x \) confers some causal power(s) on \( x \). \( P \) and \( Q \) are the same property if and only if (1) \( P \) and \( Q \) confer the same causal powers on their objects and (2) whatever is sufficient to bring about an instance of \( P \) in an object, \( x \), is sufficient to bring about an instance of \( Q \) in \( x \), and vice versa. Being triangular is a property of some objects, since it confers certain causal powers on those objects. Being triangular and being trilateral are the same property on this account (contrary, certainly, to the gerundive assumption). Much more work needs to be done to elaborate and defend a causal theory of properties, but this is not the occasion to carry out that task. All I need to note presently is that if properties are causal powers and if God is a property, then he is a causal power. Moreover, if the property that God is is variously identified as omniscience, omnipotence, moral perfection, and the like, then the property cum causal power that God is looks more and more analogous to the causal powers that ordinary persons have.

The theses I wish to defend can be displayed more schematically. I wish to collapse the property view and the property instance view to the point at least of making them ‘extensionally equivalent’, by accepting, for example, these two identities:

(1) God = Omniscience itself.
(2) God = the omniscience of God.

(1) and (2) entail that Omniscience itself just is its instance in God. If properties are causal powers, then the property of *being omniscient* (or Omniscience itself) is a causal power in virtue of which an omniscient being knows everything. In particular,

(3) The omniscience of God = the causal power in virtue of which God is all-knowing.

(2) and (3) entail

(4) God = the causal power in virtue of which God is all-knowing.

(1) and (4) entail

(5) Omniscience itself = the causal power in virtue of which God is all-knowing.

Analogous sets of identities can be developed for the ‘other’ divine attributes; when combined with (1)–(5), they will entail that Omniscience = Omnipotence, and so forth.

I do not know whether this admittedly incomplete scaffolding will hold the weight of traditional theistic belief. I believe that Morris has not succeeded in toppling it. It is fair to ask, however, why we should bother trying to erect it. I think that it offers the promise of a clarifying vantage-point from which to view many traditional theological issues. It helps us to understand and defend the doctrines of God’s sovereignty, aseity, and eternality. It sheds light on how it is that God can have knowledge of contingent fact.1 It helps us to unravel the knotty problems of God’s relation to the necessary truths2 and to morality.3 Stump and Kretzmann have recently suggested that it illuminates the cosmological argument.4 I suspect that it will enable us to appreciate more fully some of the great mystical literature, but I have not yet had time to investigate the topic.

In short, the doctrine of divine simplicity is a theory which appears to unify and make coherent many theological phenomena. As a theory it is subject to scrutiny and testing, confirmation or disconfirmation. The process has already begun. There is no reason to think that it should now be terminated.

---

1 See ‘Epistemology Supernaturalized’.
2 See ‘Modality, Morality, and God’.